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I. Introduction

In the 1972 release' that accompanied the adoption of Rule 145, 2 the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") patched up a
small portion of the nearly nonsensical and fundamentally unprincipled
rules regarding resales of securities under the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"1933 Act"). 3 In that release, the Commission stated that the matter of
resales under the 1933 Act should be considered more broadly 4
When considering the import of the Commission's statement, one
would not be overly cynical to ask two questions: First, why did it take the
Commission over forty years to reach that conclusion? Second, why m the
twenty years following its 1972 pronouncement has the Commission done
nothing except make matters worse?
To understand the breadth of the resales problem, some rather
technical definitions and descriptions are necessary The term "resales,"
as used throughout this Article, refers to any noncontrolling, 5 nonissuer's
sale of securities that the nomssuer (hereinafter a "Holder") originally
purchased from an issuer or a controlling shareholder. 6 These resales by
Holders fall within the proscription of Section 5 of the 1933 Act, 7 which
1. Notice of Adoption of Rules 145 & 153A, Securities Act Release No. 5316, [19721973 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,015 (Oct. 6, 1972) [hereinafter Securities
Act Release No. 5316].
2. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1995). See mfra notes 124-51 and accompanying text
(discussing resale provisions under Rule 145).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
4. See Securities Act Release No. 5316, supra note 1, at 82,198-199.
5. Control persons are constrained by special rules governing the sale of their securities. As matters of theory, policy, and practicality, sales by control persons differ from
the resales problems treated in tis Article and thus are excluded from further consideration
hereto.
Technically, the constraints on sales of securities by control persons work through the
interplay among §§ 5, 4(i), and 2(11) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77d(1), 77b(1)
(1994). Essentially, any control person who utilizes the services of an "underwriter," as that
technical term is defined in § 2(11) of the 1933 Act, becomes an "issuer" and thus loses its
§ 4(1) exemption from the general registration requirements of § 5.
Such limitations on sales by control persons do not have the breadth of application
as do the matters discussed in this Article and thus have much less impact on capital formation.
6. In its purchase, the Holder may be in privity of contract with the issuer or control
person, as is typically the case when the issuer or control person privately places securities or
sells registered securities in a best efforts underwriting. Alternatively, the Holder may purchase
through an intermediary, as is typically the case when an issuer utilizes the services of an
underwriter or a broker in a firmly underwritten public offering.
7 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
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makes it "unlawful for any person" 8 to offer or sell a security unless the
security is either the subject of a registration statement or exempt from the
registration requirement." The term "any person" in Section 5 is defined
broadly and easily includes Holders.10 Holders that wish to resell securi-

ties, therefore, may only do so if those securities are the subject of a registration statement or are exempt from the registration requirement.
In meeting the requirements of Section 5, a selling Holder is unable to rely on the issuer's original registration statement 1 or exemption 2
because the transactional exemptions and registrations legittmze only the
original sales by the issuer 3 but do not legitimize the further resales of the
securities by other persons. As a result, each selling Holder must either
8. See zd. (applying to "any person") (emphasis added). Although § 5 applies to "any
person," § 4(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994), exempts any person other than an
"issuer, underwriter, or dealer" from the 1933 Act registrationrequirements. Section 2(11) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1994), which defines "underwriter," includes in the
definition of "issuer," for purposes of § 2(11), "any person directly ox indirectiy controlling
the issuer." Read together, these sections subject both issuers and controlling persons to the
registration requirements of § 5.
9. Stated withimore precision, § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994), contains
a general prohibition against offers and sales of securities unless the securities are registered.
Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1994), provide exemptions from the
registration requirement. Read as a whole, therefore, these sections prohibit any person from
offering or selling securities unless the securities are either registered or exempt from the
registration requirement.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1994) (defining "person" as any individual, corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, unincorporated organization, or government).
ii. See J. WILLIAM HicKs, EXEMPTED TRANSACIoNS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 § 1.01[3] (1995) (stating that "investor's resale involves a separate transaction that must
either comply with the requirements of Section 5 or be protected by an appropriate exemption").
This statement, however, is not entirely true. If, for example, the Holder consents to being
named an underwriter in the registration statement, the Holder can resell under the original
registration, provided that the Holder meets the prospectus delivery requirement and other
requirements, such as the nine month prospectus requirements of § 10(a)(3) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(3) (1994). Similar rules apply to members of the retail selling group in a
public offering. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.508 (1995) (requiring certain disclosures concerning
dealers involved in registered offerings). As a practical matter, the foregoing is no help to most
Holders who purchase a small part of a registered offering.
12. One exception to this statement comes immediately to mind. Specifically, if the issuer
sold an exempt security, that exemption follows the security and thus exempts the Holder's
resale. See HICKS, supra note 11, at § 1.Oi[3] (discussing exemptions). See generally 15
U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2)-77c(a)(8) (1994) (exempting certain securities from 1933 Act registration
requirements).
13. Original sales by the issuer include, for example, all sales throughout the initial distribution cham in a firmly underwritten offering sold through dealer selling groups.
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register the securities or establish its own exemption from the registration
requirements.
Registration by a Holder, however, is normally impossible or impracticable, in significant part, due to the Holder's lack of access to information
about the issuer. Even if the Holder had access to such information, the
costs of registration relative to the typical size of such resales make registra-

tion unworkable.
With regard to exemptions available for reselling Holders, Section 4(1)
is the exemption of choice.

4

This exceedingly broad section exempts all

offers and sales of securities from the registration requirements of the 1933
Act except those offers and sales made by an "issuer, underwriter, or deal-

er

1115

Section 4(1) appears to operate without reference to the particular

transactional authorization under which the Holder purchased its securities

from the issuer. Instead, the availability of Section 4(1), at least on its face,
is determined strictly by whether or not the Holder is included in the

definition of "issuer," "underwriter" or "dealer. "'16
Working through the availability of Section 4(1) for a Holder's resales,

one concludes quite easily that a Holder is almost always outside the defim8 A Holder's status as an "underwriter,"
tions of "issuer"'17 and "dealer."

however, is much less clear and, indeed, the very nub of the resales problem.
One may become an "underwriter" under any one of the four independent definitions of underwriter contained in Section 2(11). 9 The first of the
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994) (exempting all persons other than issuers, underwriters, and dealers from 1933 Act registration requirements). In fact, § 4(1) is probably the
only exemption available m nearly all cases because most of the broadly available exemptions
(other than the exemptions provided by § 4(1)) are limited to offers and sales by the issuer.
The exemptions from registration provided by, for examples, § 4(2), Regulation D, and Rule
147 are also limited. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1995); 17
C.F.R. § 230.147 (1995).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994).
16. Id.
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1994) (defining issuer to include only original issuers of
securities).
18. See'15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1994) (defining dealer to include one who "engages either
for all or part of his time
as
principal, m the business of offering, buying, selling,
or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person"). Although it is
possible that a Holder could be a "dealer," that is not the usual case and not the problem
under consideration here. For a more complete definition of key terms, such as "all or part
of his time and "in the business," see HicKs, supra note 11, at § 1.01[2[d]; Louis Loss &
JOEL SELIGMAN, SEcuRriEs REGULATION 1134-36 (3d ed. 1993).
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1994) (defining underwriter). The four separate defim-
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Section 2(11) definitions of underwriter, however, is clearly the most
troublesome for a reselling Holder that seeks to qualify its resale under the
Section 4(1) exemption. Specifically, the Section 2(11) defimtion of an
underwriter as one "who has purchased from an issuer with a view to
distribution

," especially when considered in light of the gloss applicable

to the key terms in that defimtion, creates the significant risk of a wildly
inclusive concept that broadly impairs the availability of Section 4(1) for
Holders' resales.
Consider, for example, a Holder that purchases securities directly from
an issuer m a registered offering. Conventional wisdom provides that the
Holder has freely tradeable securities,20 but can we be so sure? If the Holder's freedom to trade is based on the exemption provided by Section 4(1),
which it must be, the Holder's resales on the market shortly after it acquires
its registered securities seem to cause the Holder to fall squarely within the
first definition of "underwriter" under Section 2(11). The reselling Holder

seems to have "purchased from an issuer with a view to
distribution."
More specifically, the reselling Holder in our example "purchased" its
securities and the purchase was "from an issuer." The Holder's "under-

writer" status is complete, therefore, if the Holder purchased with a "view
to distribution."21 Under long-standing interpretations, it may be impossible
tions of "underwriter" under § 2(11) are: (1) "any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to
distribution"; (2) "any person who
offers or sells for an issuer in
connection with
[a] distribution"; (3) "any person who participates or has a direct or
indirect participation in any (distribution]
"; or (4) "any person who
participates or
has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such [distribution]
" Id.
20. This is an overly broad statement and should be considered in light of the"subsequent discussion concerning resales of registered securities in Part H.B of this Article. See
irnfra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
21. In the event that the Holder purchases from an intermediary, such as an investment
banker functioning as an underwriter or a dealer that is part of a selling group, the analysis
is more complicated, but the result is essentially the same. The first definition of underwriter
in § 2(11), one who "purchased from an issuer with a view to
distribution," appears to
require direct dealing between the issuer and the underwriter, i.e., the Holder in our case.
This type of direct dealing is missing when investors such as Holders purchase their securities
from an intermediary. The second definition of underwriter, one who "sold for an issuer in
connection with [a] distribution," also appears to require direct dealing between the issuer and
the underwriter (i.e., the Holder), but at least one old and confusing case, SEC v Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 314 U.S. 618 (1941),
seems to indicate that a Holder could be considered as selling for an issuer even without
direct contact between the two. In any event, it seems quite likely that a Holder that purchased its securities from an intermediary could be an "underwriter" under either the third
or fourth definition of § 2(11). These definitions define an underwriter as a "participant" in
an underwriting or as an "underwriter" of an underwriter. Because there is no policy basis
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to conclude that a Holder who, for example, resells into the market three
months after purchasing from the issuer lacked, at the time it purchased, a
"view to distribution."22
The term "distribution" is understood to have the same meaning as
"public offering,"' which in turn is defined under the broad definition that

traces its roots back through the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in SEC v
Ralston Punna Co ' As a result, a Holder's resales would likely involve a
"distribution" or a public offering unless all of the offerees and purchasers

are sophisticated and have available the same information that would be
found in a registration statement.'s If the Holder executes its sale on an
exchange or the NASDAQ system, for example, its securities are unarguably

being offered to persons that do not meet the strict criteria necessary to avoid
inclusion in the definition of "distribution" or "public offering. "26 To be-

labor the point, one would never consider that an issuer could utilize Section
4(2) by selling through brokers on an organized market. The whole idea is

antithetical to any notion of a nonpublic offering.

for distinguishing between a Holder that purchases directly from an issuer and a Holder that
purchases from an underwriter or dealer, conditioning the definition of underwriter and thus
the availability of § 4(l) on the existence or nonexistence of an intermediary would be an
irrational interpretation. My assumption, therefore, is that a Holder would be considered
a "participant" or an "underwriter" of the underwriter if it purchased from an intermediary
with a view to distribution and thereafter made a distribution.
22. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
23. "Distribution" and "public offering" are considered synonymous. See DISCLOSURE
PoLIcY STUDY GROUP, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS THE WHEAT REPORT 161-62 (CCH 1969) [hereinafter WHEAT REPORT]; LOUIS Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 665-73 (2d ed. 1961); Andrew D. Orrick, Some Interpretative Problems
Respecting the RegistrationRequirements Under the SecuritiesAct, 13 Bus. LAW. 369, 370
(1958).
24. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
25. These concepts grow out of the private placement jurisprudence of § 4(2), 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). For a discussion of these concepts in the context of the § 4(2)
exemption for the issuer, see generally Stanley Schwartz, Jr., Private Offering Exemption:
Recent Developments, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1976); see also Carl W Schneider, The Statutory
Law of Private Placements, 14 REv SEC. REG. 869 (1981) (providing somewhat different
view regarding requirements for nonpublic offerings m § 4(2) context). For an interpretation
of these requirements in the context of Holders' resales, see DAN L. GOLDWASSER, THE
PRACTITIONER'S COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RULE 144 (1975); The Section "4(1 1/2)"
Phenomenon: Private Resales of "Restricted Securities," 34 Bus. LAW. 1961 (1979)
[hereinafter Section 4(1 112) Phenomenon].
26. Securities sold through a broker into an organized market would involve an offer
to all bidders. See LoUIs Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 280 (1983).
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Assuming, then, that our Holder's market resales of its registered securities would involve a "distribution," the Holder could still avoid underwriter
status and accordingly preserve the availability of Section 4(1) if the Holder's purchase from the issuer were made without a "view" to its subsequent
distribution or, as it is often phrased, if the purchase by the Holder were
made with an "investment intent." As with the definition of "distribution,"
the definition of "view" or "investment intent" is seated in the private
placement jurisprudence.2 7 Essentially, two doctrines have emerged to
reconcile a Holder's subsequent distribution with an initial investment intent.
First, the change of circumstances doctrine holds that a Holder's distribution
is consistent with an initial investment intent if the distribution occurs after
the Holder's circumstances change in some fairly dramatic way 28 Second,
a Holder can establish its initial investment intent by holding the securities
for an appropriate period, perhaps three years.2 9 The rationale for both of
these doctrines is that the subsequent distributions are not inconsistent with
an initial investment intent. In the case of the change of circumstances doctrine, the altered circumstances caused the Holder to change its mind. In the
case of the extended holding period, the Holder changed its mind over the
passage of time. In both cases, therefore, the Holder purchased the securities without a "view" to distribution.
This same analysis would seem to apply to securities purchased by a
Holder under a transactional exemption, such as the intrastate exemptions
provided by the common law of Section 3(a)(1 1) and Rule 1"47, Regulation A
and Section 3(a)(9). The same analysis clearly applies to resales of securities
purchased by the Holder from an issuer in transactions exempt under Regulation D or Section 4(2), where, in fact, the analysis described above had its
genesis.3" In all these cases, a Holder that proposes to resell securities taken
in such exempt transactions would appear to meet the definition of "underwriter" and thus would be unable to rely on the exemption in Section 4(1)
if, for example, the Holder makes a nonprivate resale of its securities after
acquiring its securities from the issuer.
Although the foregoing analysis is theoretically compelling, the analysis
obviously does not drive the major portion of the current or historic rules
27 See nfra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
28. Regarding the change in circumstances doctrine, see generally THOMAs HAZEN,
REGui.ATION § 4.24 (2d ed. 1990); WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23,
THELAw OF SEcuRI
at 166-70; Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 1478-88.
29. See ifra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate holding period).
30. See mfra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing resales of Restricted
Securities).
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regarding resales. The analysis does seem, however, to underlie some of the
present resales rules, such as the Commission's unctuous and ephemeral presumptive underwriter doctrine31 and its little known one percent rule under
Rule 145 32

Part of the resales problem is that strictly applying this line of analysis
throttles to some substantial degree the post-offering trading of the issuer's
securities. If subjected to a strict application of the principles outlined
above, Holders with registered securities would either have to utilize a current prospectus to effect sales, sell privately to sophisticated purchasers who
have access to all information about the issuer, or hold the securities for an
extended period of tune. Similarly, Holders of securities acquired from an
issuer m transactional exemptions also would be required, under such a strict
analysis, either to register their resales, resell privately, or hold the securities for an extended period of time.
Such strict limitations on post-offering trading would generate significant costs, not the least of which would be the additional capital costs to the
original issuer resulting from the limitations imposed on resales. If Holders
are unable to disinvest easily, the issuer's securities will be at a competitive
disadvantage compared to other investments that can be liquidated easily
As a result, the issuer will have to pay Holders a higher return to entice
them to invest.
These are not simple problems for the Commission. Nevertheless,
one should not be overly generous in evaluating the Commission's performance in this area. Substantively, the rules governing resales are unnecessarily complex and contradictory Procedurally, many of the resale "rules"
have been generated through no-action letters, a procedure that is ill-suited
for the development of important Commission policy and thus directly
related to the substantive deficiencies. In proceeding along the no-action
route, the Cominussion failed to consider resales m an appropriately broad
statutory and policy context.. Instead, the Commission considered the limited
factual situations presented in no-action requests, often with little regard
for statutory language, theoretical consistency, or sound process. As a
result, de facto regulations have been generated without any meaningful
opportunity for public comment. In short, the Conmussion has dramatically
reduced its own accountability by pursuing its rulemaking through no-action
letters.
31. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanymg text (discussing presumptive underwriter
doctrine).
32. See ztfra notes 137-40, 146 and accompanying text (discussing one percent rule
under Rule 145).
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This Article explains the failings of the Commission in dealing with
resales of securities and suggests an appropriate statutory and policy framework for a principled approach to the matter. Part II of this Article, thereforre, describes the present situation regarding the law of resales. Part III of
this Article offers a series of broad observations about resales under the 1933
Act, suggests an economic analysis for the registration provisions of the
1933 Act, and presents some more specific recommendations concerning
resale rules.
f. The "Law" of Resales
Today's rules regarding resales of securities are generally an unqualified mess. The rules lack theoretical consistency and are confusing. As a
result, the rules generate significant economic waste for corporations raising
capital, for Holders attempting to resell their securities and, in turn, for
society as a whole.
In order better to understand the broad problems of resales, this -Part II
reviews and offers criticism of the present law of resales.33 The rules governing resales vary according to the legal authorization for the issuer's original sale of securities to Holders, and this discussion, therefore, is organized
similarly
A. Resales of Restricted Secunties
The rules governing Holders' resales of securities originally acquired
from an issuer m a transaction exempt from registration under Section 4(2)"4
33. The overall purposes of this Article are to demonstrate the unprincipled treatment
of resales under the 1933 Act, to suggest that responsibility for the situation belongs with the
Commission, and to propose, at least broadly, appropriate solutions for the present state of
the law of resales. I have chosen to make these points in the context of the resales of securities acquired by Holders in the most usual of settings and have omitted any detailed consideration of resales by certain Holders, such as Holders of securities taken in transactions under
§ 3(a)(10), § 4(6), or the common law of § 3(a)(1l). My experience is that these latter three
exemptions are rarely used by issuers and thus generate significantly fewer resale problems
than do the more broadly available exemptions, such as Regulation D, Rule 147, Regulation
A and § 4(2).
Interestingly, however, the Commission has issued a number of no-action letters
regarding resales of § 3(a)(10) securities, and I will occasionally reference such letters. The
Commission's treatment of resales of Rule 3(a)(10) securities is as unprincipled as its treatment of the resales of securities described in this Article and thus supports the theses of this
Article. For a description of the Commission's position with regard to resales of § 3(a)(10)
securities, see Loss & Seligman, supra note 18, at 1588-89, and Hicks, supra note 11, at
§ 3.06[11]-[5].
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
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or Regulation D35 (such transactions are hereinafter referred to as "private
transactions" and such securities are hereinafter referred to as "Restricted
Securities") may be considered something of an exception to the general state

of confusion described above. 6 Although one may have some philosophical
disagreement about the content of the rules governing the resale of Restricted
Securities, the rules are generally principled and sufficiently clear to provide
general guidance to Holders wishing to resell Restricted Securities.
With regard to Holders' resales of Restricted Securities, the courts and
the Commssion are properly respectful of the transactional nature of the

issuer's exemption and enforce the requirements for the availability of Section 4(1) m a theoretically sound fashion. In order to ensure the availability
of the Section 4(1) exemption, Holders, therefore, must take steps to avoid
being included in the definition of "underwriter." As stated previously,
Holders are most vulnerable to the risk of inclusion in the first of the four
underwriter definitions - one who "purchased from an issuer with a view
to
distribution." A Holder's unregistered resale of Restricted Securities,

therefore, must be effected in a way that either negates a finding that the
Holder took with a "view" to distribution or in a way that does not involve
a "distribution."
Rule 144 is the best known of the Commission's actions dealing with

the resale of Restricted Securities." 7 Although as originally enacted Rule 144
was unavailable to smaller issuers,3" an asinine situation that the Cominmis35. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1995).
36. Securities issued in a transaction exempt from registration under § 4(6), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(6) (1994), should also be included in these defined terms. The § 4(6) exemption, however, appears destined only to be a historical curiosity and thus deserves no serious attention
in this paper.

37 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1995).
38. It is unclear exactly how a nonreporting issuer, especially a genuinely closely held
issuer, meets the terms of Rule 144(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1995), which requires "available adequate current public information" about the issuer. The Commission has opined that
the condition is met if periodic reports are provided to issuer's stockholders, financial
servicers, dealers, and marketmakers. See Division of Corporate Finance's Interpretations
of Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 5306, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,000, at 82,157 (Sept. 26, 1972). Although the uncertainty created by the
requirements of Rule 144(c) make that Rule less attractive and less available for small issuers,
Rule 144, as originally promulgated, required that all sales under Rule 144 by Holders be
made in brokers' transactions. This requirement was an utter impossibility for Holders of
securities in small companies. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers
Under the SecuritiesAct of 1933: PracticalForeclosurefrom the CapitalMarket, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 1139, 1150-53. Specifically, defining "brokers' transactions" as prohibiting any
"solicitation of orders to buy" eliminated Rule 144 as a basis for Holders' resales of securities

RESALES OF SECURITIES UNDER THE '33 ACT

1343

sion has somewhat ameliorated,3 9 Rule 144 generally has been judged a
huge success. 4" At a practical level, Rule 144 permits a limited amount
of resales of Restricted Securities, provided that information about the
issuer is publicly available, the Holder observes a holding period, and the
sales are made in brokers' transactions.41 Alternatively under Rule 144,
the Holder may resell essentially without restrictions after a three year hold-

mg period.42
More important at this point in the discussion, however, is the theoretical underpinning for Rule 144. If resales of Restricted Securities by a
Holder meet the requirements of Rule 144, the Rule provides that the trans-

action is not considered a "distribution."43 As a result, the Holder does not

become an "underwriter" under Section 4(1) and the availability of the

Section 4(1) exemption is thereby preserved. All of this makes perfect sense
within the construct of the 1933 Act. Accordingly, while one may disagree
with the particular requirements of Rule 144, as I have done in the past,44 the

theoretical underpinnings of the Rule are solid.
Two separate common-law theories for the resale of Restricted Securities also developed. These theories are, like Rule 144, supported on an

appropriate theoretical footing.

Under these theories, Holders of Re-

of closely held companies because the absence of an organized market for the closely held
securities made it impossible for the Holder to resell without a solicitation of the buy order.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(f) (1995).
39 In 1981, the Commission amended Rule 144 to add § (k), 17 C.F.R. §230.144(k)
(1995), which permits a Holder to resell after three years without complying with certain
provisions of Rule 144, including the brokers' transaction requirements. These amendments
were adopted in Resales of Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6286, [1981 Transfer
Binder], Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,821 (Feb. 6, 1981). Unfortunately, § (k) is not
available for resales by Holders that are "affiliates," which significantly limits the availability
of the section for Holders of securities of closely held companies. See Rutheford B
Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (And Others) Under RegulationD: Those Nagging
Problems That Need Attention, 74 KY. L.J. 127, 156-62 (1985-86).
40. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECuRITInS REGULATION CASES & MATERIALS
468 (1991) (stating that "Rule 144 is widely viewed as one of the Commission's most
successful undertakings"). From the beginning, Rule 144 was considered successful. See,
e.g., Martin Lipton et al., Rule 144 - A Summary Review After Two Years, 29 Bus. LAW
1183 (1974). For a more recent discussion of Rule 144, see James Fogelson, Rule 144 - A
Summary Revew, 37 Bus. LAW. 1519 (1982).
41. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144(),(d),(f) (1995).
42. See Fogelson, supra note 40, at 1519
43. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b) (1995).
44. See Campbell, supra note 39, at 156-62.
45. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing change of circumstances
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stricted Securities are able to preserve their Section 4(1) exemption by

making sales in ways that do not cause them to fall within the first defimtion of "underwriter" as one that "purchased with a view to
distribution."
One of these theories ("public resales outside Rule 144") preserves the

availability of Section 4(1) for Holders who acquired securities without a
"view" to distribution. Under this theory, even if the Holder makes a "distribution," the Holder does not become an underwriter if at the point of
acquisition the Holder had no "view" (i.e., no intent or purpose) to make the

subsequent distribution that in fact it made. This absence of a "view" is also
referred to as an "investment intent.""
A Holder can establish an investment intent either through the change
in circumstances doctrine or by abiding by a suitable holding period require-

ment. Under the change of circumstances doctrine, subsequent public
resales of the Holder's Restricted Securities, even if such resales are close

in time to the Holder's acquisition, are considered not inconsistent with the
Holder's having purchased with an initial investment intent because it is
reasoned that an unanticipated change in the Holder's circumstances caused
the Holder to change its mind with regard to its initial investment intent.47

The other way a Holder can establish a proper investment intent is to hold
its Restricted Securities for an extended period of time, perhaps three

years." In that case, the subsequent distribution does not indicate that the
and holding period doctrines). Despite Rule 144's solid theoretical foundation, the Commission has at times seemingly tried to muddy the water, or, even in one instance, has tried to
eliminate a common-law theory by admimstrative terrorism. Notwithstanding that, when
adopted, Rule 144 was practically unavailable to Holders of securities of small issuers, the
Commission attempted to force all resales of Restricted Securities into Rule 144 transactions
by declaring an elimination of the change in circumstances doctrine. In doing so, the Commission stated that holding securities for "a particular period of time does not by itself establish the availability of an exemption." The Commission also emphasized the "substantial
burden of proof' that selling Holders have in establishing an exemption outside of Rule 144
and declared an end to no-action letters on such resales. See Adoption of Rule 144, Securities
Act Release No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,487 (Jan.
11, 1972).
46. See Loss, supra note 23, at 665-73; Stephen R. Volk & Carl W Schneider, The
Sale of Restricted Securities Outside of Rule 144, Eighth Annual Institute of Securities
Regulation 135-48 (1977); WHEAT REPORT, supra note 23, at 160-77
47 Regarding the change in circumstances doctrine, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
48. While the exact required holding period is subject to some uncertainty, the clear
weight of authority seems to establish that holding restricted securities for three years establishes an investment intent on the part a Holder. See GoLDwASsER, supra note 25, at § 12.02
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Holder purchased with a "view" to distribute its securities but, instead, indicates that the "view" or intent to sell developed over the protracted holding
period.49

The second broad common-law theory for the resales of Restricted

Securities is predicated upon such resales being made only in private transactions. As in the case of public resales outside Rule 144, this common law

theory is also conceptually sound. Typically referred to as the "Section 4(1
1/2) exemption,""° the fundamental rule is that a Holder of securities acquired in a private transaction may sell its Restricted Securities at any time,
so long as the resales do not constitute a distribution.5 Thus, if a Holder of
Restricted Securities' sells to one who is sophisticated and has access to all
material information about the issuer, 52 the sales will be exempt under
(stating that it was "firmly established through literally hundreds of letters that SEC staff
requires a three year holding period" for Restricted Securities); Carl W Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Federal SecuritiesActs - A ProgramforReform, 116 U. PA. L. REV 1323,
1337 (1968); Section 4(1 112) Phenomenon, supra note 25, at 1972; A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
ConsiderationsLeadingto the Adoption ofRule 144, 67 Nw. U. L. REv 65, 69 (Supp. 1972).
Two distinguished commentators remind us, however, that the Commission earlier
seemed content with a one year holding period. See Sommer, supra, at 69; Loss, supra note
23, at 671-72. Over time, the length of the holding period expanded, but commentators
generally agree that it has settled around the three year mark.
In United States v. Sherwood, 175 F Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y 1959), the court permitted
a resale after two years, but the matter arose in a criminal prosecution and the prosecution
had the burden of proving its case "beyond a reasonable doubt." In Ackerberg v Johnson,
892 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1989), the court easily concluded that a four year holding period was
sufficient. In the course of the opinion, the court acknowledged that "[m]any courts have
accepted a two-year rule of thumb to determine whether the securities have come to rest"
(citing only United States v Sherwood as authority) and that Professor Loss has "noted that
a three-year holding period to be 'well nigh conclusive."' Id. at 1336. In Gilligan, Will &
Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959), the Second Circuit
held that a ten month holding period was insufficient to demonstrate an investment intent.
49. See Section 4(1 1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 25, at 1972 (stating that "existence
of a relatively long holding period serves a dual function, both substantiating the seller's
original investment intent and evidencing that any 'distribution' by the seller is not 'for the
issuer').
50. For descriptions of the' so-called § 4(1 1/2) exemption for resales of Restricted
Securities, see Section 4(1 1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 25, at 1961; Carl W Schneider,
Section 4(1 1/2) - Private Resales of Restricted or Control Securities, 49 OHIO L.J. 501
(1988), reprintedin 1 SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 312 (Franklin E.
Gill ed., 1991); CarlW Schneider, Section 4(1 1/2): A 1990 Update, 1 SELECTED ARTICLES
ON FEDERAL SECUITIES LAW 325 (Franklin E. Gill ed., 1991).
51. The term "distribution" is considered synonymous with "public offering." See
supra note 23 and sources cited therein (discussing meaning of distribution).
52. The requirements of sophistication and access to all material information are the
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Section 4(1). The Holder avoids inclusion m the first defimtion of
underwriter because, even though the Holder purchased from an issuer and
resold quickly, the Holder's sale did not constitute a "distribution."
All of this law governing Holders' resales of Restricted Securities is
well known and, more importantly for this paper, well seated theoretically
These interpretations preserve the Section 4(1) exemption for the Holder by
excluding the Holder from the defimtion of "underwriter." Because under
Rule 144 or the common-law interpretations discussed above, the Holder is
considered either to lack a "view" or, alternatively, not to be involved in a
"distribution," the selling Holder is not considered to be one who "purchased
from an issuer with a view to
distribution."
B. Secunties Acquired in a Registered Offenng
Although it popularly may be considered that Holders of securities
acquired from an issuer in a registered offering (such securities are herein
referred to as "Registered Securities") may freely resell those securities,
such Holders, at least theoretically, appear to be in the same situation as
Holders of Restricted Securities. The issuer of the Registered Securities
utilized a transactional authorization for its sale, and thus Holders of the
Registered Securities must find their own separate transactional authorization
for their resales. The availability of Section 4(1) for public resales of
Registered Securities appears problematic, however, because a Holder who,
shortly after acquiring Registered Securities, resells publicly would seem to
fit within the definition of "underwriter" in Section 2(11)," thereby destroying the availability of Section 4(l)."
Such a strict interpretation of the concept of "underwriter" and the
resulting limited availability of Section 4(1) may not, as a policy matter, be
attractive due to the adverse impact on the post-distribution market for
Registered Securities. Especially if one has some idea that the efficient
market may be at work"5 and that the disclosures accompanying the issuer's
heart of the § 4(2) exemption for the issuer, as that exemption has developed through the
common law. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 17 For a somewhat different approach to the
requirements of a § 4(2) exemption, see Schneider, supra note 25, at 869-83. Commentators
are not m complete agreement about the requirements of the § 4(1 1/2) exemption and just
how closely the requirements of § 4(2) must be followed m order to meet the § 4(1 1/2)
exemption. Compare Section 4(1 1/2) Phenomenon, supra note 25, at 1976 with GOLDWASSEIR, supra note 25, at §12.07.2 and Campbell, supra note 39, at 147-51.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ii) (1994).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994).
55. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theores, Assumptions, & Securities Regulation:Market
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imtial registration and the continuous reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act")56 may result in information
being absorbed and appropriately priced by the market for the issuer's
Registered Securities, one may be especially concerned about the costs of
limited trading in the post-distribution market. Nonetheless, Section 4(1)
and Section 2(11) create substantial conceptual problems for free trading by
Holders of Registered Securities.
The Commission has a long and unimpressive record in dealing with
resales of Registered Securities. The Commission has been unguided by
principle and has been unconstrained by statutory language, changing its
position with some frequency Thus today, although it seems possible to
approximate the word description for the Commission's rules governing the
resale of Restricted Securities, one feels little confidence regarding the
stability or actual meaning of the rules.
The popular view among commentators is that for years the so-called
presumptive underwriter doctrine guided the Commission's policy regarding
the resale of Registered Securities." Under tis doctrine, the Commission
considered certain large purchasers of Registered Securities to be "underwriters" if such purchasers engaged in the public resale of their Registered
Securities," and, as a result, such Holders were unable to rely on the
exemption provided by Section 4(l)."9
The Commission's criteria for presumptive underwriter status seemed
to change over the years. Initially, the Commission appeared to apply a ten
percent test, considering a Holder of Registered Securities to be a presumptive underwriter if the Holder acquired ten percent of the registered
offering.6" Commentators, relying principally on no-action letters, noted,
however, that the Commission over time abandoned this simple ten percent
test in favor of a multifactor test for presumptive underwriter status.6 1Thus,
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV 851 (1992) (discussing impact of efficient market
theory as it relates to securities regulation).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994).
57 See HICKS, supra note 11, at § 9.02[5][a] (discussing evolution of presumptive
underwriter doctrine); Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 1112-16 (same); Robert A.
Barron, Control & Restncted Securities, 15 SEc. REG. L.J. 296 (1987) (same).
58. See Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 1114 n.577
59. See d. at 1114.
60. See HICKS, supra note 11, at § 9.02[5][a].
61. See id. Professor Hicks states the following regarding the evolution of the presumptive underwriter doctrine:
Initially, the SEC staff's response was direct and certain. A person who acquired
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in addition to the traditional percentage test for presumptive underwriter
status, the Commission also considered such factors as the "

(1) Nature

of Issuer
(2) Trading Volume
(3) Number of Shares Outstanding
(4) Quantity of Shares to Be Acquired
(5) Nature of the Offering
(6) Relationship Between Recipient and Issuer

Security

(7) Nature of the

i62

Overlaid on this entire analysis was the Commission's position that
resales by a presumptive underwriter were permissible, provided that the

resales met the requirements of sections (c), (e), (f) and (g) of Rule 144.63
Broadly stated, this meant that resales by a presumptive underwriter could
be made without registration if information about the issuer were publicly
available, the resales did not exceed the one percent limitations of Rule 144,
and the resales were effected only in brokers' transactions.64 Unfortunately,

more than 10 percent of the securities included in an offering was deemed to be
a statutory underwriter.
Beginning in 1972, the SEC staff abandoned the 10
percentrule of thumb. At first, the SEC staff replaced the objective standard with
an approach that varied with the nature of the issuer. Under this transitional
interpretation of the doctrine, the 10 percent rule continued to apply where the
issuer was going public for the first time. Where the issuer was already in a
trading market for its securities, the staff's interpretation depended upon all of the
circumstances, including the volume of trading in the issuer's securities.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Regarding the evolution of the presumptive underwriter doctrine,
Professors Loss and Seligman state:
For a while, [the Commission] applied a rule of thumb in terms of 10 percent of
the issue. Gradually, they began to consider percentage as simply one factor
together with other circumstances such as the total amount of the issuer's
securities outstanding, the size of the "float," and whether the issuer was a
reporting company under the 1934 Act. And in recent years, no-action letters
have tended simply to apply by analogy the volume figures in Rule 144: the
greater of (1) 1 percent of the amount outstanding or (2) the average weekly
reported volume of trading during the last four weeks.
Loss & SELIGMAN, supranote 18, at 1114-15 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
62. HICKS, supra note 11, at § 9.02[5][b].
63. See, e.g., Equimark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,131 at 76,594 (July 23, 1985); James River Corp. of Va.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14308 (S.E.C.), at *1, *2 (Aug. 2, 1979); American Fin.
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9585 (S.E.C.), at *8, *9 (Nov 2, 1973).
64. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144(c), 230.144(e)-(g) (1995). Obviously, I speak without
precision regarding the requirements of the particular sections of Rule 144. For example, the
amount limitations of § (e) of the Rule are defined in terms of sales during a three month
period. A Holder's sales cannot exceed "the greater of (i) one percent of the shares
outstanding
or (fi) the average weekly reported volume of trading in such securities
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1995).

RESALES OF SECURITIES UNDER THE '33 ACT

1349

the Commission developed these "rules" as it developed nearly all of its
"rules" regarding resales of Registered Securities, through its no-action
responses, which, as observed earlier, subjected none of this to the comment

process.
In 1983, however, the Commission m the Amencan Council of Life

Insurance no-action letter6" apparently abandoned the presumptive underwriter doctrine, an abandonment subsequently confirmed by officials of the

Commission.' To complicate matters further, the Commission is now reluctant to issue no-action letters on the resale of Registered Securities, proffermg as its reason, not that such process is inappropriate for such rulemaking,
but, instead, that such requests involve "facts and circumstances" decisions
that can better be made by selling Holders than by the Commission.67
Notwithstanding such an apparent reluctance on the part of the Comnussion to issue no-action letters, a number of no-action letters, beginning with
the Amencan Council of Life Insurance letter, establish that today the
Commission will interpose no objection to a Holder's resales of significant
amounts of Registered Securities, so long as such a Holder acquired its
Registered Securities in the "ordinary course" of business and the Holder has

"no arrangement with [the issuer or] any person to participate in the distribution of such securities." 6" The meaning of the "ordinary course" language
65. American Council of Life Ins., SEC No-Action Letter, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,526, at 78,692-93 (May 10, 1983).
66. See Loss & SLUGMAN, supra note 18, at 1114-15 n.577 In November of 1986,
the Director of the Commission's Division of Corporate Finance stated:
For many years, a concept known as the "presumptive underwriter" doctrine
existed. That doctrine assumed that a purchaser of a relatively large amount of
securities covered by a registration statement (at one point 10%) was buying with
a view to distribution and, therefore, should be deemed a statutory underwriter.
The theory was most subjective, most difficult of explication and presented
considerable problems both in compliance, as well as administration. In 1983, in
theAnencan Council ofLife Insuranceletter the presumptive underwriter doctrine
"was for all intents and purposes abandoned"
Nothing in the Securities Act
compelled the view that a person acquiring a substantial part of an offering should
be treated differently from any other investor with a large position in the issuer,
unless the purchaser becomes an affiliate as a result of the purchases.
Id. (quoting Quinn, Redefining "Public Offering or Distribution" for Today, Address to Fed.
Reg. of See. Com. (Nov 22, 1986)).
67 See Mission Resource Partners, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 233680
(S.E.C.) at *4 (Jan. 21, 1988).
68. See K-I1 Communications Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 166858
(S.E.C.), at *1, *5 (May 14, 1993); American Council of Life Ins., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 77,526, at 78,693 (May 10, 1993);
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is highly problematic, but the criterion grew out of the facts of particular no-

action requests from institutional Holders,69 such as insurance companies, m
which instances the criterion is generally intelligible. On the other hand, the

criterion seems unsuited for determinations of many noninstitutional Holders. Finally, under today's rules, any Holder that is potentially subjected to
underwriter status under the Commission's present day criteria apparently

-may still effect resales with impunity if it complies with sections (c), (e), (f)
and (g). 70

The Commission's rules regarding the resale of Registered Securities

are, as will be developed subsequently m this Article, broadly typical of
resale rules generally The rules are confusing, ephemeral, poorly promulgated, and flout both the language of the 1933 Act and proper administrative
procedure. As a policy matter, it may be that the Commission's criteria in
this area are designed simply to separate Holders' resales that are "small
potatoes," 7 I but such is a
potatoes" from Holders' resales that are "big
mean undertaking for the Commission. The Commission has at its disposal

Terminal Data Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WI 217852 (S.E.C.), at *6, *7 (Sept.
3, 1992); Epic Properties, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 216064 (S.E.C.), at *2, *6 (Oct.
14, 1991); Warnaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 209850 (S.E.C.), at *3, *4 (Oct.
11, 1991); Morgan Stanley, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,018 at 78,885-86 (June 5, 1991); Mary Kay Cosmetics, SEC NoAction Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,016, at 78,879
(June 5, 1991); Exxon Capital Holding Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234336
(S.E.C.), at *3 (Apr. 13, 1988); Mission Resource Partners, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter,
1988 WL 233680 (S.E.C.), at *3, *5 (Jan. 2, 1988).
Additionally, the Holder who is an affiliate of the issuer cannot freely trade in its Registered Securities because such a Holder can become an "issuer" within the meaning of § 2(11)
if it resells publicly through an "underwriter," thereby losing its § 4(1) exemption.
69 See K-III Communications Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 166858
(S.E.C.), at *1, *5 (May 14, 1993); American Council of Life Ins., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,526, at 78,691-693 (May 10,
1993); Terminal Data Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 217852 (S.E.C.), at *6, *7
(Sept. 3, 1992); Epic Properties, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 216064 (S.E.C.), at *2,
*6 (Oct. 14, 1991); Wamaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 209850 (S.E.C.), at *3,
*4 (Oct. 11, 1991); Morgan Stanley, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer
76,018 at 78,885-886 (June 5, 1991); Mary Kay
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
Cosmetics, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,016, at 78,879 (June 5, 1991); Exxon Capital Holding Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1988 WL 234336 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Apr. 13, 1988); Mission Resource Partners, L.P., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 233680 (S.E.C.), at *3, *5 (Jan. 2, 1988).
70. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing permissibility of resales
that comply with Rule 144).
71. See Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 1114.
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sufficient admstrative tools to bring order and predictability to tins area
and to do so in a manner that is consistent with the statutory language and
underlying policy of the 1933 Act. Unfortunately, the Commssion has
proceeded otherwise.
C. Securities Acquired in an IntrastateOffering

From an isuer's point of view (especially a small issuer), the intrastate
offering exemption provided by Rule 14772 is one of the most attractive
vehicles under the 1933 Act for the sale of securities by an issuer.73 Rule
147 permits issuers to sell unlimited amounts of securities ("Intrastate
Securities") to unlimited numbers of purchasers and imposes no prerequisite

disclosure requirements. Rule 147 does, however, limit the general availability of the exemption by requiring issuers to be incorporated and doing
business m the same state where the offerees and purchasers have their

principal place of residence.74 These requirements limit to a large extent the
availability of Rule 147 for financmgs by larger corporations, but truly small
72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1995).
73. See Campbell, supra note 39, at 1167-72 (discussing improvements to intrastate
exemption embodied in Rule 147). For years, Rule 147 was the most attractive exemption.
Recently, however, the Commission has significantly relaxed the requirements of Rule 504,
which is now probably the most attractive exemption for an issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504
(1995).
Prior to the adoption of Rule 147, the lack of predictability of the § 3(a)(l) exemption
and the small amount of common law that had developed thereunder made the intrastate
exemption unattractive. See Tom A. Alberg & Martin E. Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 &
147" The Nonpublic & Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registrationfor the Sale of
Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV 622, 648 (1974) (stating that "[b]ecause of these risks, major
underwriters have adopted a general policy of refusing to participate in intrastate offerings");
Robert S. Kant, SEC Rule 147 - A FurtherNarrowing of the Intrastate Offering Exemption,
30 Bus. LAw. 73, 74-75 (stating that it is "extremely dangerous to rely upon the exemption
exceptunder almost laboratory conditions"). Notwithstanding such lack of predictability and
the resulting risks, the § 3(a)(ll) exemption and the limited amount of common law that
developed thereunder was widely used. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN
COMMERCE, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEC. MKTS. OF THE SEC, H.R. Doe. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 572-73 (1963) (stating that there are "indications of the offer and
sale of a substantial volume of securities to the investing public under the color of the
intrastate exemption"). Section 3(a)(l1) and the common law thereunder continue to be most
unattractive for issuers and thus will receive no further specific attention in this paper.
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (setting forth requirements for intrastate offering
exemption); see also 3. William Hicks, Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147, 72 MICH. L.
REV 463 (1974) (describing Rule 147 exemption in detail); HICKS, supra note 11, at § 4.01
(discussing general applicability of Rule 147); Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 12941307 (same).
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corporations may find the Rule 147 exemption available to a surprising
degree.
In addition to the foregoing requirements, the availability of Rule 147
to the issuer is predicated on Holders abstaining from interstate resales for
nine months.75 During the nine month holding period, however, the Holder
may make intrastate resales.7 6 Tius requirement is designed to ensure that
the securities come to rest in the hands of truly local investors.7 7
The nine month holding period requirement, however, is relevant only
with regard to the availability of Rule 147 for issuers and is not intended
to provide an independent exemption for Holders' resales. 75 This interpretation, of course, is consistent with the transactional nature of Rule
147, 79 but for Holders it means that they must find their own exemptions
for resales of Intrastate Securities. Conceptually, that requirement presents
a tough problem.
The only exemption generally available for Holders of Intrastate
Securities is, once again, Section 4(1), which exempts sales by persons
other than issuers, underwriters and dealers. Because, as described earlier,
the availability of Section 4(1) is entirely unrelated to the transactional
authority for issuers' sales of securities to Holders, the logical statutory
interpretation is that the rules regarding the resales of Restricted Securities
under Section 4(1) also should apply to resales of Intrastate Securities."0
Under such a regime, a Holder of Intrastate Securities, m order to avoid
inclusion in the "underwriter" defimtion and the resulting loss of its Section
4(1) exemption for its resales, would be required to effect resales in a
manner that is either consistent with an initial investment intent (i.e.,
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1995). Technically, Rule 147(e) restricts a Holder
to intrastate resales "for a period of nine months from the date of the last sale by the
" Id. Thus, if the Holder were to purchase its securities m the early part of a
issuer
protracted offering by the issuer, the Holder's holding period could be substantially m excess
of nine months from the date of its purchase.
76. See id. (describing limitations on resales).
77 See Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under the Securities Act, Securities Act
Release No. 5450, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,617, at
83,653 (Jan. 7, 1974).
78. See id. at 83,654 (stating that Intrastate Securities held by Holders are "unregistered
securities that [can] only be reoffered and resold pursuant to an exemption from the
registration provisions of the Act.").
79 See id. at 83,650.
80. See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (discussing resales of Restricted
Securities).
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following an extensive holding period or a change m circumstances) or in
a way that does not involve a "distribution" (i.e., through private resales)."'
Although the foregoing analysis is conceptually attractive, such an
interpretation would, as a practical matter, impose material costs on Rule
147 transactions. Free trading in the post-offering market for Intrastate
Securities would be throttled to a significant degree. Additionally, the costs
of raising capital through a Rule 147 offering would increase because
Holders would have to be paid for the costs imposed on them by limited
transferability
Viewed otherwise, such a strict interpretation would also render Rule
147's nine month holding period superfluous, in that Holders of Intrastate
Securities would be restricted much beyond the nine month holding period
nposed by Rule 147 Instead, in order to qualify the resales for the
Section 4(1) exemption, Holders of Intrastate Securities would face a three
year holding period (or a change in circumstances or private resale requirement).
The Commission's response to the problems of resales of Intrastate
Securities is to turn a benevolently blind eye to the matter by taking the
position that Holders of Intrastate Securities may resell their securities with
impunity after complying with the nine month holding period of Rule 147 82
The Commission has offered no explanation of or theoretical support for
this position, which, again, is found only in the Commission's no-action
letters.
To make matters worse, the Commission, as it is wont to do," has
carved out an unprincipled exception to this unprincipled basic rule. Tis
exception, which also is found only in the Commission's no-action letters,
provides that Holders that purchase their Intrastate Securities in a transaction that is essentially private will not be permitted unlimited sales after a
81. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing manner m which Holders
may avoid inclusion in definition of "underwriter").
82. See Synbiotics Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55619 (S.E.C.), at *4, *7*9 (July 22, 1985); Dinner'Levison Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28805 (S.E.C.),
at *11 (Oct. 19, 1983); Quail Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14781 (S.E.C.), at
*2 (Dec. 11, 1978). At least one early author opined that holding intrastate securities for nine
months would be sufficient to remove the Holder from the definition of "underwriter." See
Robert S. Kant, SEC Rule 147- A FurtherNarrowmng of the Intrastate Offenng Exemption,
30 Bus. LAw. 73, 93 (1974) (stating that effect of Rule 147 is that original purchaser will not
be underwriter if he resells in accordance with paragraph (e)).
83. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's one percent
rule).
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nine month holding period, but, instead, will be required to make sales in
compliance with the resale restrictions of Rule 144.84
As a conceptual matter, none of tis makes sense. The basic rule that
Holders' interstate resales of Intrastate Securities are exempt after a nine
month holding period is entirely mconsistent with the rules governing resales
of Restricted Securities. No statutory basis exists for the distinction. The
basic rule merely sweeps under the carpet the fact that a public resale of
Intrastate Securities, whether such resale is intrastate or interstate, appears
to cause the Holder to fall squarely withln the defintion of an underwriter,
indicating that the Holder purchased with a view to distribution, and thus
eliminating the Section 4(1) exemption for such a Holder.
The basic rule's exception (that resales of privately placed Intrastate
Securities must be made only under Rule 144) is troubling on various
grounds. First, the scope of this exception is not entirely clear. Is the exception triggered only if the transaction in which the Intrastate Securities
were taken meets the technical requirements of Section 4(2)? One assumes
that technical compliance is not required for the applicability of the
exception, but if that were the case, then the exception's limits become quite

narrow

85

Second, resale options for one caught by the exception are unclear. Can
such a Holder of Intrastate Securities utilize only Rule 144, or can the Holder also sell publicly or privately pursuant to the common law of resales, i.e.,
outside Rule 1449 Certainly the better position and, indeed, the only
theoretically defensible position is that any Holder of Intrastate Securities
subjected to the exception should be able to resell under the common law as
well as Rule 144,86 but, again, that is not clear.
84. See Dinner Levison Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28805 (S.E.C.), at
*3, *4, *11 (Oct. 19, 1983) (stating that individuals who received Rule 147 securities in
§ 3(a)(10) transaction and became affiliates of issuer must sell pursuant to Rule 144 but twoyear holding period does not apply); Acceleration Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL
10425 (S.E.C.), at *4, *5 (Nov 12, 1976).
85. Some disagreement exists regarding the requirements for the issuer's exemptions
m § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). I am convinced that the most
fundamental criteria are that the offerees and purchasers be sophisticated and have access to
all information that would be contained in a registration statement. See Banco de Bilbao,
Application For Exemption 812-6497, 1987 WL 11637 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Jan. 13, 1987);
Doran v Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that
"relevant factors include the number of offerees and their relationship to each other and the
issuer, the number of units offered, the size of the offering, and the manner of the offering").
It seems unlikely that an issuer's sale of securities structured under Rule 147 would also meet
the technical requirements of § 4(2).
86. Any limitation on the right of a Holder of Intrastate Securities freely to trade such
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Finally, the exception is impossible to square with the Commission's
basic rule. If under the basic rule a Holder does not become an underwriter
when it publicly resells intrastate securities held for nine months, the
outcome must be,based on the theory that a nine month holding period
establishes that the Holder acquired such securities without a "view to
distribution" and thus is not an underwriter. This analysis is unchanged by
the fact that the Holder took its Intrastate Securities in an essentially private
transaction. The Holder's status (or nonstatus) as an underwriter is
unaffected by the type of transaction in which the Holder acquired its
securities.
At a pragmatic level, however, the Commission's position on all this
may seem defensible, at least if one indulges in a couple of assumptions. If
one assumes that most resales of Intrastate Securities generally tend to
involve dollar amounts that are small, perhaps the Commission need not be
too concerned about enforcing rigid resale rules. The Commission's current
approach, therefore, makes some practical sense. On the other hand, the
exception to the general rule of free tradeability may be based on the
assumption that each of the limited number of Holders in a privately placed
Intrastate Securities offering may own a proportionately significant share of
the Intrastate Securities offering and thus resales by such Holders may
involve not insignificant amounts of securities. In that case, the Commission
may have more concern, due to the potential size of such resales, and thus
conclude that some more stringent limitation on resales of these Intrastate
Securities is required.
Even to ramble through this attempt at explanation shows just how
deeply flawed such a line of analysis tends to be. The explanation obviously
is based on numerous leaps of faith and is wildly general regarding its factual
assumptions. Moreover, the Commission's action (or inaction) leaves significant theoretical and administrative problems untreated. Resales of Registered Securities and Restricted Securities create precisely the same conceptual problems under Section 4(1) as do resales of Intrastate Securities. If
sound policy bases exist for treating the problems differently, the Commission should act pursuant to its legitimate rulemaking power to deal with the
matter.
securities is based on the Holder's status as an underwriter and the resulting loss of the exemption provided by § 4(i). A Holder of such Intrastate Securities can avoid inclusion in the
definition of underwriter by complying with the common law of private resales, which
negates the existence of a "distribution," or by complying with the common law of public
resales, which probably requires a three year holding or a change in circumstances. See
supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (discussing § 4(i) exemption).
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D SecuritiesAcquired in a Section 3(a)(9) Transaction

Section 3(a)(9) of the 1933 Act87 provides a transactional exemption for
an issuer that offers to exchange its new securities "with its existing security
1"88 Subject to meeting certain conditions, 89 an
holders exclusively
issuer may utilize the exemption both m exchanges structured as corporate
transactions90 and in exchanges effected directly with its security holders?'

The policy basis for the exemption appears somewhat problematic when
considered in light of the 1933 Act generally' but may represent an attempt
87 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1994).
88. Like the statutory intrastate exemption contained in § 3(a)(l1) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994), the exemption provided by § 3(a)(9) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(9) (1994), is mislabeled in the 1933 Act as pertaining to "Exempted Securities."
Clearly, however, § 3(a)(9) provides only a transactional exemption. See HICKS, supra note
11, at § 2.08 (stating that "[a]s a transactional exemption, § 3(A)(9) provides an exemption
only once; it does not exempt the subsequent sale of the new securities once received'").
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(3)(9) (1994). The statute predicates the availability of the
exemption on the fact that "no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or
indirectly for soliciting such exchange." Id. Other significant conditions unposed on the
availability of the exemption include the application of the integration concept and a
prohibition against any material consideration other than the issuer's outstanding securities
flowing from the exchanging security holder to the issuer. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
18, at 1228-41.
90. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 1228-41. An example of such a transaction would be a recapitalization of an issuer effected through amendment to the issuer's
articles of incorporation changing significantly the rights of preferred stockholders. As
examples of such transactions, see Bailey v Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F Supp. 418, 419-22
(D. Del. 1944); Western Foundry Co. v Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722, 723-25 (Ill. 1949); State
ex rel. Weede v Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853, 856-60 (Iowa 1948), cert. denibd, 337 U.S. 918
(1949); Franzbau v. Capital See. Co., 64 A.2d 644, 645-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div 1949);
Wessel v Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215, 216 (N.J. Ch.), aff'd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J.
1944); Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d 200, 201-02 (N.J. Ch. 1943), aff'd, 35 A.2d
894 (N.J. 1944).
91. An example of such a transaction is a situation in which the issuer offers each
preferred stockholder the right to exchange Ins or her preferred stock for a subordinated
debenture. In that instance, each preferred stockholder individually has the right to accept
or reject the offer. For an interesting twist on these "voluntary" exchanges, see the old but
instructive case, Barrett v Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F Supp. 198, 199-201 (D. Del.),
aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944).
92. Recapitalizations were historically perceived by many legal commentators to involve
the opportunity, often exploited, to mistreat securityholders, principally preferred stockholders. See E.Merrick Dodd, Jr., Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations- From
Vested Right to Mirage, 57 HARV L. REv 894, 898-99 (1944); E.Merrick Dodd, Jr., Fair
& EquitableRecapitalizations, 55 HARV L. REV 780, 791-93 (1942); Norman D. Lattin,
A Primer on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 W RES. L. Rev 3, 13-27 (1949); E.R.
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to balance the needs of the corporation's security holders-investors against
the needs of the reorganizing corporation for an expeditious and economi-

cally efficient reorganization.93
Regarding resales of securities taken in Section 3(a)(9) transactions
(such securities are herein referred to as "Section 3(a)(9) Securities"),

Holders of Section 3(a)(9) Securities have the same theoretical posture as
Holders of Registered Securities, Restricted Securities, and Intrastate

Securities. Specifically, Holders of Section 3(a)(9) Securities purchased
securities from an issuer in an exempt transaction and, accordingly must
resell pursuant to their own transactional authorization. Section 4(1), again,
appears to be the only exemption generally available to such Holders, and
the availability of that exemption, again, appears problematic in light of the
fact that reselling Holders may be considered to have "purchased from an
issuer with a view to

distribution" and thus be underwriters.

The Commission's resale rules for Section 3(a)(9) Securities are shaped
primarily by its approach to the Section 3(a)(9) exchange itself. Generally,

the Commission appears to consider the Section 3(a)(9) exchange a neutral
event. The new securities received by the Holder in the exchange are
subject to the same resale limitations as the old securities that the Holder
surrendered in the Section 3(a)(9) transaction. Accordingly, a Holder in
possession of freely tradeable securities prior to the Section 3(a)(9) exchange
will possess freely tradeable securities after the exchange. Conversely, if the
Holder's old securities were restricted, the Holder's new Section 3(a)(9)
Securities also will be deemed restricted.94
Laty, Fairness- The Focal Point in PreferredStockArrearageElimination, 29 VA. L. REv
1, 24-51 (1942); John F Meek, Jr., Accrued Dividends on Cumulative PreferredStocks: The
Legal Doctrine, 55 HARV L. REV 71, 78-79 (1941); Note, Protectionfor Shareholder
Interests in Recapitalizationsof Publicly Held Corporations,58 COLUM. L. REV 1030, 1031
(1958); Note, A Standardof Fairnesfor CompensatingPreferredStockholders in Corporate
Recapitalizations, 33 U. CHI.L. REV 97 (1965).
93. See Allen E. Throop & Chester T. Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the
SecuritiesAct of 1933, 4 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 89, 97-98 (1937); see also Loss, supra note
23, at 573 (noting that § 3(a)(9) exemption may represent nothing more than "horse-trade
compromise").
94. See Auto Fin. Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 257229 (S.E.C.), at
*4 (Dec. 3, 1991); Calton, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 199473 (S.E.C.), at *7,
*19 (Sept. 30, 1991); J. Gregory Milmoe, Selected Issues in Restructuring Public Debt
Securities, in 224TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1992 419, 427 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-793, 1992) (stating that "Section
3(a)(9) is considered to be a transaction exemption. The Staff has determined that New
Securities acquired in a Section 3(a)(9) Exchange are subject to the same resale restrictions,
if any, as the Old Securities. The securities retain the same character before and after the
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Some commentators suggest an exception to the foregoing general rule
regarding resales if the exchange in which the Holder received its Section
3(a)(9) Securities were essentially a private transaction. Specifically, these

commentators suggest that the resale of Section 3(a)(9) Securities received
m a fundamentally private exchange may be subject to restrictions, even
though the old securities
surrendered by the Holder were freely tradeable
95
prior to the exchange.

It is not clear, however, that the Commission imposes such an exception
to its general approach of considering the Section 3(a)(9) exchange a neutral

event. The Commission's handling of no-action requests suggests that even
in situations where the Holder received its Section 3(a)(9) Securities m a
private transaction, the Commission follows its general rule that such securiexchange"); see also TV Answer, SEC No-Action Letter, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,816, at 78,299-303 (Nov 19, 1993); Sports/Leisure, Inc., SEC NoAction Letter, 1992 WL 227959 (S.E.C.), at *12 (Sept. 11, 1992); Echo Bay Mines, Ltd.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 180224 (S.E.C.), at *6, *7 (July 27, 1992); Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176765 (S.E.C.), at *2, *3 (June
24, 1991); Mr. Coffee Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178808 (S.E.C.), at *4-*6
(June 6, 1991); Attwoods, ple, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176649 (S.E.C.), at *4, *5
(Jan. 28, 1991); Terminal Data Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 304941 (S.E.C.),
at *2, *3 (Nov 19, 1990); Superior TeleTec Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 287003
(S.E.C.), at *4, *6 (Oct. 26, 1990); Saatchi & Saatchi Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL
236227 (S.E.C.), at *3, *5 (May 18, 1989); Siliconix Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL
234289 (S.E.C.), at *2, *3 (Apr. 15, 1988); La Jolla Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987
WL 108819 (S.E.C.), at *1, *2 (Nov. 24, 1987); Iomega Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987
WL 108458 (S.E.C.), at *3, *4 (Oct. 12, 1987); Wedgestone Realty Investors Trust, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 233594 (S.E.C.), at *3, *5 (Sept. 16, 1987); Hooker Enters.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108338 (S.E.C.), at *1, *2 (Sept. 3, 1987); Maxus Energy
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 108351 (S.E.C.), at *6, *7 (Aug. 13, 1987);
Financial Corp. of Santa Barbara, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108244 (S.E.C.), at *3
(May 20, 1987); Timken Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66503 (S.E.C.), at *3, *4
(Dec. 19, 1986); Dynalectron Corp. & DFC Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67375
(S.E.C.), at *2, *3 (Oct. 10, 1986); Waldorf Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67029
(S.E.C.), at *10-*12 (May 29, 1986); American Greetings Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1986 WL 66812 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Apr. 26, 1986); Southwest Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter,
1986 WL 66822 (S.E.C.), at *5 (Feb. 19, 1986); Southwest Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter,
1986 WL 65215 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Jan. 14, 1986); Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1985 WL 54512 (S.E.C.), at *9 (Oct, 17, 1985); Clevepak Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1984 WL 44974 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Feb. 23, 1984).
95. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 1586-88; HICKs, supra note 11, at
§ 2.08[2][b] (recognizing potential for § 3(a)(9) Securities to fall within restricted securities
found in Rule 144(a)(3), but arguing correctly that reading "is neither consistent with the
purpose of Rule 144, nor is it protective of the public
"). It is also worth noting that this
suggested possible exception sounds much like the exception to the generally free tradeability
of Rule 147 Securities, as described in the immediately preceding section.
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ties carry only the same (if any) resale restriction as did the prior securities
96
held by the Holder and exchanged in the Section 3(a)(9) transaction.
The rules governing the resales of Section 3(a)(9) Securities are vulnerable to the same criticisms as those previously made regarding the resales of
other, securities. The Commission in this area continues to follow an unprmcipled path. The resale rules are vague and confusing, which generates complexity and costs for society, problems exacerbated by the poor promulgation
of the resale rules.
E. Secunties Acquired in a Regulation A Offenng
Regulation A,97 a transactional exemption scheme enacted by the
Comnssion under the statutory authority of Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, 9
allows an issuer to raise up to $5 million in an interstate, public offering.99
Although Regulation A in a technical and legal sense is an exemption from
the registration requirements of Section 5, a Regulation A offering looks
much like a registered offering, because the availability of the Regulation A
exemption is predicated on the issuer's filing an offering statement (analogous to a registration statement) with the Commission and delivering an
offering circular (analogous to a prospectus) to each investor. The disclosure requirements under Regulation A, however, are less burdensome for
the issuer than are the normal disclosure requirements for a registered offering. The availability of Regulation A also depends on the issuer's meeting
certain other conditions, but those conditions generally do not tend to be
particularly burdensome or exclusionary "
96. See Calton, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 199473 (S.E.C.), at *1, *3
(Sept. 30, 1991) (raising no objection to resales of § 3(a)(9) Securities by five istitutional
investors who had received their securities in exchange with issuer involving only issuer and
five institutions); Clevepak Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 44974 (S.E.C.), at *3
(Feb. 23, 1984) (raising no objection to resales by investment advisor of § 3(a)(9) Securities
that had been taken in exchange involving only issuer and investment advisor).
97 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1995).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1994).
99. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (1995).
100. Generally regarding Regulation A, see THOMAS L. HAZEN, 2 THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.15 (1990); Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 1319-38;
ICKS, supra note 11, at §§ 5.01-.11, see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTAL, SECURrnES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §§ 5.04-.05 (1993); Robert S. Green & Dan Brecher, Part 1.
When Making a Small Public Offenng Under RegulationA (withforms), PRAC. LAW., Mar.
1980, at 25; Robert S. Green & Dan Brecher, Part 2: When Making a Small Public Offenng
Under Regulation A (with forms), PRAC. LAW., Apr. 1980, at 41, Roy L. Brooks, Small
Business FinancingAlternatives Under the Securities Act of 1933, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV
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Regulation A, therefore, at least upon imtial consideration, appears to

have an important place in capital formation, because it is, except for Rule
504 (which has a relatively low ceiling amount), 1° the only exemption of
general applicability available to an issuer for an interstate public offering.
Unfortunately, at least in recent years, Regulation A has been an inefficient
vehicle for use by issuers in capital formation," ° due principally to the unfavorable treatment of Regulation A offerings under state blue sky laws."°

Holders of securities issued in Regulation A transactions (such Holders
are hereinafter referred to as "Regulation A Holders" and such securities are

hereinafter referred to as "Regulation A Securities") that wish to sell their
Regulation A Securities face exactly the same theoretical problem described

m the preceding sections. Specifically, if such Regulation A Holders resell
publicly they appear to meet the statutory definition of "underwriter" and

thus lose their Section 4(1) exemption.
Research reveals no no-action letters dealing generally with resales of

Regulation A Securities."

4

Broadly applicable Commission pronouncements

543, 561-66 (1980); James T. Glavin & Francis J. Purcell, Securities Offenngs & Regulation
A - Requirements & Risks, 13 Bus. LAw. 303 (1958); Gustav B. Margraf, Does Securities
Regulation Hinder Financing Small Business, 11 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 301 (1945);
Leland E. Modesitt, Exemptions from Registration Under the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 27 NEB.
L. REV 43 (1947); Ezra Weiss, Highways & Byways Revisited, 15 N.Y.L.F 218 (1969);
Ezra Weiss, Regulation A Under the Securities Act of 1933 - Highways & Byways, 8
N.Y.L.F. 3 (1962); Note, Federal Control Over Small Issues of Securities, 70 HARV L. REV
1438 (1957).
101. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (1995) ($1,000,000 ceiling).
102. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 1319 n.279 (presenting interesting
statistics regarding use of Regulation A over past years).
103. For a discussion of the drawbacks to Regulation A, see HICKS, supra note 11, at
§ 5.11[1]. My own view is that the impact of state blue sky laws is the primary reason for
the underuse of Regulation A. Because states generally have not permitted registration by
coordination m Regulation A offerings, issuers utilizing Regulation A are often required to
register by qualification in each state in which the Regulation A offering is made. This
requirement eliminates the savings otherwise available to issuers utilizing Regulation A.
104. Two no-action letters deal with resales of Regulation A Securities acquired in
Rule 145 transactions. The first of the letters, Orbanco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975
WL 9537 (S.E.C.), at *1 (June 16, 1975), indicates that such Regulation A Securities are
freely tradeable by Holders, unless under Rule 145(c) the Holder was an affiliate of the
company acquired m the Rule 145 transaction, in which case public resales by the Holder
would cause the Holder to become an underwriter. The letter goes on to state that the special
resale provisions of Rule 145(d) are not available for such a Holder of Regulation A
Securities. A later letter, Indian Head Banks Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14023
(S.E.C.), at *3 (May 29, 1979), essentially confirms the foregoing analysis, except the
Commission indicates a change in its position regarding the availability of Rule 145(d) for
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regarding the resale of Regulation A Securities are also essentially nonexistent. The scant and indirect authority from the Commission on resales
of Regulation A Securities and the general authority one may garner from
analogies to the resale rules described in the preceding sections, however,
support the conclusion that Regulation A Securities held by a Holder are
normally freely tradeable. 5 Commentators also agree that m most cases
Regulation A Securities are freely tradeable by Holders. 6
The difficult question remains, however. When, if ever, is this general
rule of free tradeability for Regulation A Securities supplanted by an
exception? Stated differently, in what circumstances is a Holder who
publicly resells Regulation A Securities considered an underwriter and thus
without its Section 4(1) exemption?
Answers to these questions are even more problematic because of the
nature of Regulation A itself, which operates like a registered offering but
in fact is an exemption. On the one hand, therefore, at least one distingushed commentator is attracted by the analogy to Registered Securities and
thus suggests that Holders of Regulation A Securities may be subjected to the
same resale rules as Holders of Registered Securities. 7 On a policy basis,
such an approach can be justified if one has faith that a reasonably efficient
market for corporate information usually operates with respect to Registered
and Regulation A Securities."e Under tins approach and in light of what
seems to be today's rules for resales of Registered Securities, Regulation A
Securities in the hands of Holders would be freely tradeable unless such
securities are not acquired by the Holder in its ordinary course of business
resales by Holders who are affiliates of the acquired corporation. The Commission stated that
such Holders may resell Regulation A Securities in reliance on Rule 145(d).
105. As described previously, except with regard to Restricted Securities, the general
rule regarding resales of all securities acquired by Holders pursuant to transactional authorizations is that such securities are freely tradeable, subject, however, to certain exceptions. It seems quite unlikely that the Commission would apply a different general rule to
the resale of Regulation A Securities than it applies to the resale of such other securities
issued pursuant to transactional authorizations. But, this conclusion leaves unanswered the
"difficult question" discussed in the next preceding paragraph of the text, winch is the rule
the Commission would apply regarding the exception (if any) to the general rule of free
tradeability.
106. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 1321, BLOOMiEAL, supra note 100,
at § 4.08[2][e].
107 See BLooMENTHAL, supra note 100, at § 4.08[2][e].
108. See rd. (stating that "justification [comes from] the fact that the shares have been
registered (or qualified under Regulation A) and appropriate disclosure has been made before
the securities have reached the marketplace").
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or unless some arrangement exists between the issuer and the Holder
regarding the distribution of the Regulation A Securities."°
On the other hand, one may consider the resale of Regulation A
Securities more attractive than the rules regarding the resale of securities
acquired by Holders in exempt transactions, but the distinct circumstances
surrounding such exempt offerings and the weak theoretical support
underlying the resale rules for such securities may make those resales poor
models for Regulation A resale rules. For example, the analysis supporting
the rules governing the resales of Restricted Securities, despite its conceptual
attractiveness, has never been applied to resales of nonrestricted securities.
The rules governing the resale of Intrastate Securities are dominated by the
text of Rule 147 itself and its nine month holding period. These rules, once
again, seem unsuited for expansion into the rules governing the resale of
Regulation A Securities. Finally, the rules regarding the resale of Section
3(a)(9) Securities are dominated by the neutral event analysis and the central
fact of the exchange, factors that appear to strain such rules if applied to the
resale of Regulation A Securities.
As a result, the analogy to Registered Securities clearly is most compelling, and thus a Holder with Regulation A Securities should be able to
expect the same resale rules as a Holder of Registered Securities. Registered
Securities seem closest to Regulation A Securities both in the structural
nature of the initial offerings by the issuer and in the probability that mformation about the offering and the issuer has been made available to the
public and thus absorbed into the price of the securities. From a regulatory,
legal, and policy point of view, however, all of this is once again unsatisfactory
F Securities Acquired in a Rule 145 Transaction
1 Generally
All the problems described heretofore are exaggerated in the case of the
rules governing the resale of securities taken in a Rule 145 transaction. A
109 Professor Bloomenthal characterizes the situations in which Regulation A Securities
may not be freely tradeable by a Holder as follows:
There are a few situations in which purchasers in a registered or
Regulation A offering because of their association with the securities industry,
the underwriter, or the issuer, or because the purchaser acquired a disproportionately large part of the offering may be deemed underwriters in connection
with their resales.
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brief look at Rule 145110 and its history is helpful to understand these resale
rules and associated problems."'

Rule 145 was enacted by the Commission in 1972112 principally for the
purpose of eradicating the mischief of old Rule 133."' That old rule, the so-

called "no-sale" rle, dealt with the issuance of securities in acquisitions and
single company recapitalizations and provided that in most instances the
securities issued in such transactions were not subject to the registration

provisions of the 1933 Act. The essential fiction of Rule 133 was that an
acquisition or recapitalization is a corporate transaction and thus the stockholders acquiring securities in such a transaction are not making any investment decision, but, instead, the acquired or reorganized corporation as an

entity, as opposed to stockholders receiving newly issued securities, is
making the investment decision. As a result, such a transaction did not involve a "sale" of securities to the stockholders of the acquired or recapitalized company, even though (and this, of course, was the nonsense of the no-

sale rule) the stockholders of the acquired or reorganized company approved
the transactions by their affirmative votes." 4
Instead of just repealing Rule 133, however, the Commission through

Rule 145 enacted a series of provisions dealing with the issuance and resale
of securities acquired in corporate acquisitions and recapitalizations (such

transactions are hereinafter referred to as "Rule 145 Transactions" and such
110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1995).
111. The administrative history of Rule 145 is both interesting and instructive as it
concerns the points made in this section. Since its enactment, the Commission has only once
addressed the interpretative problems created by the rule in a systematic fashion, and that
occurred shortly after the Rule was adopted. See Division of Corporation Finance's
Interpretations of Rule 145 & Related Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 3058, at 3067-3 (Feb. 28, 1974). To a much lesser extent, the Commission
dealt with some resale problems under Rule 145 in a more general 1979 interpretive release.
See Resale of Restricted & Other Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-6099, 1 Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH)
2705H, at 2819-3 (Aug. 2, 1979). Otherwise, the Commission has
proceeded to interpret Rule 145 through no-action letters. At the date of this Article, the
Commission had issued more than 887 no-action letters on Rule 145.
112. Rule 145 was firstproposed in Notice of Proposed Adoption of Rules 145 & 153A,
Securities Act Release No. 5246, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCI-)
78,753 (May 2, 1972), and was adopted in Securities Act Release No. 5316, supra note 1
at 79,015.
113. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1971) (repealed by 37 Fed. Reg. 23,636 (1972)).
114. For a description of Rule 133, see Loss, supra note 23, at 518-42; Andrew D.
Orrick, RegistrationProblems Under the Federal SecuritiesAct - Resales Following Rule
133 & Exchange Transactions, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1958-59); Securities Act Release No.
5316, supranote 1, at 82,198.
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securities are hereinafter referred to as "Rule 145 Securities"). As a result,
Rule 145 is different in scope and purpose from the more usual exemptive
rules, such as the intrastate exemption provided by Rule 14715 or the
essentially private placement or small offering exemptions provided by

Regulation D

116

Rule 145(a) provides, and correctly so, that a "sale" of securities occurs

when stockholders of the acquired or recapitalized company vote to approve
the transaction and accordingly to receive the newly issued Rule 145
Securities.'
This provision of the Rule accommodates the reality of the
situation, which is, contrary to the fiction of old Rule 133, that stockholders
voting to approve an acquisition or recapitalization in which they will

exchange their old securities for new securities make a significant investment
judgment. As a result, such investors have a valid claim for the protection
of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act.' Because Rule 145 merely
115. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1995). See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 147).
116. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1995). For an explanation and criticism of Regulation
D, see Campbell, supra note 39; Manning G. Warren IIl, A Review of Regulation D: The
Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Underthe SecuritiesAct of 1933, 33 AM.
U. L. REv 355 (1984); Mark F Donahue, Regulation D: A Primerfor the Practioner,8
DEL. J. CORP. L. 495 (1983).
117 More specifically, Rule 145 provides that a sale occurs
are concerned where, pursuant
so far as the security holders of a corporation
to statutory provisions
there is submitted for the vote or consent of such security holders a plan or agreement for
(1) a reclassification of securities of such
corporation
., (2)
a statutory merger
or similar plan
in winch
held by such security holders will
be exchanged; or (3)
a
securities
m consideration of the
transfer of assets [by the security holder's corporation]
issuance of securities, [provided the securities received by the corporation are
distributed to security holders in certain fashions].
17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (1995).
118. An interesting and serious body of literature, of course, argues the neoclassical
economists' point that saddling corporations with mandated disclosure requirements results
in an economically inefficient allocation of information and thus is undesirable. For a
discussion of this point of view, see RICHEA A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 44448 (4th ed. 1992). Purposefully, I avoid a discussion of this scholarship. Accordingly, the
statement in the text that investors voting of mergers and recapitalizations have a "valid claim
for the protection of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act" is based on a consistency
argument. Such voting investors are making investment decisions (albeit collectively) and
thus need the disclosure of the 1933 Act as much as individual investors. I leave for another
day the question of whether the 1933 Act is efficient and, perhaps even more interestingly,
whether the Act is nonetheless morally attractive, even if it generates a certain level of
inefficiency.
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defines Rule 145 Transactions as those involving sales of securities to the

stockholders of the acquired or recapitalized company that receive Rule 145
Securities and because Rule 145 provides no exemption from the registration

requirements of the 1933 Act, issuers of Rule 145 Securities must either
register the Rule 145 Securities or qualify such securities for an exemption

from the registration requirements.
Rule 145 also contains explicit rules regarding the resale of Rule 145
Securities, and these provisions are the principal focus of this part of this

Article. The resale provisions of Rule 145 work definitionally, providing
in section (c) that a Holder who publicly resells Rule 145 Securities will be
deemed to be engaged m a "distribution," and thus an "underwriter," if such

Holder were a control person of the acquired or recapitalized company prior
to the Rule 145 Transaction (such a control person is sometimes herein referred to as a "Rule 145 Affiliate"). 9 The operational theory of this
provision, of course, is that a Holder that is a Rule 145 Affiliate and engages
in such public resales loses its Section 4(l) exemption because such a Holder
is an "underwriter." On the other hand, a Holder who is not a Rule 145
Affiliate is apparently outside the definition of "underwriter" and thus may

resell freely because the Holder qualifies for the Section 4(1) exemption. 20

119. The scope of Rule 145(c) is apparently much broader than my description in the
text. Specifically, the public resale of Rule 145 Securities by any of the following persons
is a "distribution" and thus causes the selling Holder to be considered an "underwriter"' ."any
party to any [Rule 145] transaction
, other than the issuer, or any person who is an
affiliate of such party
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1995). Practically, however, only
control persons of acquired or reorganized companies are concerned about this limitation.
120. As is so often the case when dealing with Commission rules, unqualified statements
are impossible. On the one hand, clear language in the Commission's no-action letters indicates that Holders of Rule 145 Securities that were not control persons of the acquired or
recapitalized company may freely sell their securities. See Coastal Int'l, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1980 WL 15023 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Dec. 24, 1980) ("securities received in a Rule 145
transaction by persons who are neither affiliates of the acquired company nor of the acquiring
company are registered securities without restriction on resale"). On the other hand, the
Commission has suggested the possibility that certain noncontrol persons facilitating mergers
could become underwriters. See Division of Corporation Finance's Interpretations of
Rule 145 & Related Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5463, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
3058, at 3067-68 (Feb. 28, 1974). Also, as will be described subsequently, the Commission's one pereentrule purports in certain instances to apply resale restrictions to Holders that
acquire more than one percent of the company's stock in a Rule 145 Transaction even though
such persons arenotRule 145 Affiliates. See znfra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's one percent rule). As a final example, not surprisingly, Rule 145
Securities issued in transactions exempt under § 4(2) or,Regulation D and held by Holders
who are not Rule 145 Affiliates are also subject to the resale restrictions. See znfra notes 14751 and accompanying text.
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Rule 145, however, contains specially crafted resale provisions for a
Holder that is a Rule 145 Affiliate. Section (d) of the Rule declares that

public resales of the Rule 145 Securities by a Holder will not be considered
a "distribution" and accordingly the Holder will not become an "underwriter" if the Holder's resales meet any one of the three prescribed sets of

conditions contained in section (d)of Rule 145 The conditions are based on
a combination of some parts of the Rule 144 resale conditions and/or a holdmg period.' ' Again, Rule 145(d) operates defimtionally, defining reselling
Holders to be outside the defimtion of "underwriter" and thereby preserving
the Section 4(1) exemption for Holders that are Rule 145 Affiliates.
The seeming relative simplicity and compactness of the resale provisions of Rule 145 are, however, grossly misleading.'
To demonstrate the

confusion and extreme complexity of the rules governing the resale of
Rule 145 Securities, it is helpful to consider separately the manner in which
the general resale provisions of Rule 145(c) and (d), as outlined above, are

applied to resales of: (1) Rule 145 Securities acquired in registered offerings (hereinafter "Registered Rule 145 Securities"); (2) Rule 145 Securities
acquired in offerings exempt under Section 3(a)(9), Rule 147," z or Regulation A (hereinafter "Exempt Rule 145 Securities"); and (3) Rule 145
Securities acquired in offerings exempt under Section 4(2) or Regulation D
(hereinafter "Restricted Rule 145 Securities"). The resale provisions

applicable in each of these three situations differ from the other two situations. To make matters even more complex, the resale provisions applicable
in each of the three situations also often differ from the resale rules
applicable in the non-Rule 145 counterpart to each of the Rule 145 situa-

tions. Again, no statute or policy necessitates such complex differences.
121. Under Rule 145(d), resales are not considered to be a "distribution" and, therefore,
the reselling Holder is not considered an "underwriter" if the Rule 145 Securities are: (1) sold
"in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (c) [the issuer has current information
publicly available], (e) [sales m any three month period do not exceed one percent of
outstanding stock], (f) and (g) [sales made only m brokers' transactions] of Rule 144";
(2) held for two years and current information is publicly available; or (3) held for three
years. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1995).
122. For an extensive discussion of the resale rules governing Rule 145 Securities, see
Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Rule 145: Mergers, Acquisitions & Recapitalizations Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 56 FORDHAM L. REV 277, 315-38 (1987), reprntedin II SELECTED
ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 309 (Franklin E. Gill ed., 1990).
123. For purposes of this section, I again limit my discussion of the intrastate exemption
to Rule 147 because I consider the common law of § 3(a)(i 1) to be so uncertain and risk laden
as to be unworkable and thus unworthy of extensive discussion. See supra note 73 (discussing
risks inherent in common law of § 3(a)(1i)).
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To the contrary, such differences are inconsistent with the language of
the 1933 Act and are contrary to the policy underlying the 1933 Act as
well.
2. Resales of Registered Rule 145 Secunties
Consistent with the general language of Rule 145(c), as described

above, a Holder of Registered Rule 145 Securities that resells publicly is
within the definition of an "underwriter" if the Holder is a Rule 145 Affili-

ate. 2 4 The Commission, in its no-action letters, also has manifested its
willingness to be bound by the negative implication of Rule 145(c) as it

applies to the resale of Registered Rule 145 Securities. Thus, Holders of
Registered Rule 145 Securities that are not Rule 145 Affiliates may resell
freely, relying on their exclusion from the definition of "underwriter,"
which, in turn, preserves the availability of the Section 4(1) exemption for
their resales."as
Holders of registered Rule 145 Securities that are Rule 145 Affiliates
and thus caught in Rule 145(c)'s defimtion of underwriter have several
options to effect an exempt resale. Most obviously, Rule 145(d) is available
for such resales. Also, such Holders may preserve their Section 4(1) exemption by reselling
privately 126 (i.e., in a transaction that does not involve a
"distribution") 27 or by reselling after a suitable holding period or change in
-circumstances, since, for the same reasons described in Part lI.A, above,

such resales would not cause a Holder who is a Rule 145 Affiliate to become
124. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1995) (stating that "affiliate" of "party to any
[Rule 145 Transaction]
who publicly offers or sells" Rule 145 Securities is considered
to be involved in "distribution and therefore to be an underwriter").
125. See Securities Act Release No. 5316, supra note 1, at 79,015; Coastal Int'l, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 15023 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Dec. 24, 1980) ("[S]ecurities received
in a Rule 145 transaction by persons who are neither affiliates of the acquired company nor
of the acquiring company are registered securities without restriction on resale").
126. Authority for the permissibility of a private resale of Registered Rule 145 Securities
can be found in the language of Rule 145(c), which defines Rule 145 Affiliates as "underwriters" only if they "publicly" resell the Registered Rule 145 Securities. More directly, noaction letters concede that resales of Registered Rule 145 Securities can be made privately.
See Sidney Stahl, SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 24892 (S.E.C.), at *2 (Mar. 23, 1981).
For a more general discussion of the use of private resales as a techique for the seller to
avoid inclusion in the underwriter definition and preserve his or her § 4(i) exemption, see
supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
127 Although not defined in the 1933 Act, "distribution," as used in the § 2(11)
definition of "underwriter" is considered to have the same meaning as "public offering" in
§ 4(2). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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an underwriter, thereby, again, preserving the Section 4(1) exemption for the
reselling Holder.
Significantly, the rules regarding the resale of Registered Rule 145
Securities differ.from the rules regarding the resale of non-Rule 145 Registered Securities. For example, under today's rules, as described previously,
a Holder of non-Rule 145 Registered Securities apparently is considered an
"underwriter" by the Commission only if either the Holder's ptqrchase of the
Registered Securities was not in the ordinary course of the Holder's business
or the Holder had some arrangement with the issuer to participate in the
distribution of the securities." 2 On the other hand, a Holder of Registered
Rule 145 Securities becomes an underwriter if it were a control person of the
acquired or recapitalized company Another difference in the two situations
is that the special resale provisions of Rule 145(d) are unavailable to Holders
of non-Rule 145 Registered Securities because Rule 145(d) is specifically
limited to resales of Rule 145 Securities.' 2 9
Finally, as will appear below, the rules regarding resales of Registered
Rule 145 Securities differ from the rules regarding resales of Exempt
Rule 145 Securities and Restricted Rule 145 Securities.

3. Resales of Rule 145 SecuritiesAcquired in TransactionsExempt
Under Sections 3(a) (9), Rule 147, and Regulation A
Holders of Exempt Rule 145 Securities (i.e., Rule 145 Securities
originally issued under an exemption provided by Section 3(a)(9)," 0 Rule
147,131 or Regulation A 32) are also subject to the defimtions in Rule 145(c).
As a result, a Holder that engages in a public resale of Exempt Rule 145
Securities is considered to be involved in a "distribution" and thus .an

128. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
129 The Rule specifically states that a Holder "shall not be deemed to be engaged in a
distribution and therefore not to be an underwriter of registered securities acquiredin a
transaction specified in paragraph(a) of [Rule 145]
if
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)
(1995) (emphasis added). In its no-action letters, however, the Commission has indicated that
a Holder of registered non-Rule 145 Securities caught in the Commission underwriter criteria
may resell pursuant to conditions that are the same as the conditions umposed by the first
section of Rule 145(d). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1995). For an overview of § 3(a)(9) and a citation to works
on the Section, see supranotes 87-93 and accompanying text.
131. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1995). For a description of Rule 147, see supra notes 72-79
and accompanying text.
132. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263 (1995). See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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"underwriter," if the Holder is a Rule 145 Affiliate. In such a case, the
Holder loses its Section 4(1) exemption for such resales. 33
The Commission, at least m most instances, also applies the negative

implications of Rule 145(c) to resales of such Exempt Rule 145 Securities.
Accordingly, public resales of Exempt Rule 145 Securities by Holders that
are not Rule 145 Affiliates are not considered "distributions," and, as a

result, such reselling Holders do not become "underwriters" and do not lose
their Section 4(1) exemption.'
133. With regard to resales of Exempt Rule 145 Securities acquired by a Holder under
§ 3(a)(9), § 3(a)(10), or Regulation A, see 1st United Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995
WL 15077 (S.E.C.) (Jan. 13, 1995); National Security Ins. Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
1990 WL 286379 (S.E.C.) (Apr. 12, 1990); First NH Banks, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1988 WL 234464 (S.E.C.) (June 27, 1988); First NH Banks, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987
WL 107497 (S.E.C.) (Dec. 24, 1986); Commerce America Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1985 WL.55695 (S.E.C.) (Nov. 15, 1985); Arizona Silver Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1985 WL 55565 (S.E.C.) (June 26, 1985); Metheus Dev Partners., Ltd., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1985 WL 54034 (S.E.C.) (Feb. 27, 1985); Saver's Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter,
1985 WL 52009 (S.E.C.) (Jan. 3, 1985): Merrill Lynch & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977
WL 10873 (S.E.C.) (July 7, 1977).
With regard to resales of Rule 145 Securities acquired by a Holder in a Rule 147 transaction, see La Jolla Bancorp, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108819 (S.E.C.) (Nov 24,
1987); Hungry Tiger Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29446 (S.E.C.) (Aug. 12, 1982);
United Virgmia Bankshares, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 9785 (S.E.C.) (Feb. 13,
1978).
134. Regarding resales by a Holder of Rule 145 Securities acquired under § 3(a)(9),
§ 3(a)(10) or Regulation A, see Storage Equities, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL
28393 (S.E.C.) (June 2, 1983) (§ 3(a)(9)); Fairway Land Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990
WL 286078 (S.E.C.) (Feb. 6, 1990) (§ 3(a)(10)); Commerce America Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1985 WL 55695 (S.E.C.) (Nov 15, 1985) (§ 3(a)(9)); Federated Guar. Life Ins. Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 28162 (S.E.C.) (Mar. 21, 1983) (§ 3(a)(10)); Western Gulf
Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29474 (S.E.C.) (July 26, 1982) (§ 3(a)(10));
North American General Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 30018 (S.E.C.) (Dec. 9,
1981) (§ 3(a)(10)); Indian Head Banks, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14023
(S.E.C.) (May 29, 1979) (noting that affiliates of acquired corporations may resell their
Regulation A securities if they comply with Rule 145(d)); Orbanco, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1975 WL 9537 (S.E.C.) (July 16, 1975) (Regulation A Securities received m Rule 145
transactions are freely tradeable by individuals not affiliates of acquired corporation).
The Commission stated m an interpretive release, however, that Rule 145(d) is available
to Rule 145 affiliates for resales of Rule 145 Securities originally issued pursuant to Regulation A, § 3(a)(9), or § 3(a)(10). See Resale of Restricted & Other Securities, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6099, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705H, at 2819-27 (Aug. 2, 1979)
(indicating that securities purchased under any of those three exemptions are subject to resale
rules of Rule 145); see also Physicians Clinical Laboratory, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1992 WL 289096 (S.E.C.) (Oct. 13, 1992) (§ 3(a)(10)); National Security Ins. Co., SEC NoAction Letter, 1990 WL 286379 (S.E.C.) (Apr. 12, 1990) (§ 3(a)(10)); Amoco Canada
Petroleum Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234330 (S.E.C.) (Apr. 13, 1988)
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Two notable exceptions to this broad application of the negative
implication of Rule 145(c) exist, however. First, Holders of Intrastate Securities that are not Rule 145 Affiliates are nonetheless required to refrain from

an interstate resale of their securities for at least nine months following the
last offering by the issuer. Compliance with tis restriction on resales is

required by Rule 147(e) and thus, as a technical matter, is necessary to preserve the availability of the Rule 147 exemptionfor the issuer 135 Accordingly, while the holding period requirement of Rule 147(e) has nothing
whatsoever to do with the availability or non-availability to the-Holder of the

exemption for its resales provided by Section 4(1), the practical impact of
section (e) is to limit the Holder to only intrastate resales during that nine
month period.136

The other exception to the broad applicability of the negative implication of Rule 145(c) is more complex and insidious. The Commission in a
series of no-action letters developed its one percent rule, which it applies to
limit the resales of certain Exempt Rule 145 Securities by Holders who are
not Rule 145 Affiliates. Although the terms of the one percent rule are almost as vague137 as they are unprincipled, the apparent impact of the rule is
(§ 3(a)(10)); Tamal Energy, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 233727 (S.E.C.) (Jan.
29, 1988) (§ 3(a)(10)); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL
108063 (S.E.C.) (July 24, 1987) (§ 3(a)(10)); Rosenmon, Colin, Freund, Lewis & Cohen,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 15240 (S.E.C.) (Jan. 30, 1980); Pacwest Bancorp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14720 (S.E.C.) (Sept. 24, 1979) (§ 3(a)(9) and § 3(a)(10));
Orbanco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9538 (S.E.C.) (June 20, 1975) (no-action
letter issued prior to Release No. 33-6099 which indicates Rule 145(d) may be available for
Rule 145 Affiliates that originally took under Regulation A).
Regarding resales of Rule 145 Securities acquired by a Holder in a Rule 147 Transaction, see United Virginia Bankshares, SEC NO-Action Letter, 1978 WL 9785 (S.E.C.), at
*1 (Feb. 13, 1978) (Commission left unchallenged statement in no-action request letter that
"non-affiliates
following the satisfaction of Rule 147(e) would be able to resell the
securities acquired in the merger transaction without restriction"); BSD Bancorp., Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 30450 (S.E.C.) (Apr. 9, 1982) (Rule 147 securities issued in 145
transaction to nonaffiliates may be freely resold after nine months).
135. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1995) (stating that availability of Rule 147 to issuer
is predicated on fact that during nine month period following last Rule 147 sale by issuer,
resales of Rule 147 Securities are made "only to persons resident within such state or
territory"); see also supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
136. See Hungry Tiger, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29446 (S.E.C.), at *2
(Aug. 27, 1982); United Virginia Bankshares, SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 9785
(S.E.C.), at *l-*2 (Feb. 13, 1978).
137 For example, even the calculation method of the one percent is uncertain. Thus,
it is uncertain whether the one percent threshold for the application of the rule is calculated
as a percentage of the total outstanding shares, the total outstanding shares in the particular
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to treat any Holder of certain Exempt Rule 145 Securities 13 as the equivalent

of a Rule 145 Affiliate if the Holder acquired more than one percent of the
issuer's outstanding securities in the exempt Rule 145 transaction (these
Holders are hereinafter referred to as "One Percent Holders"). 139 This
class, or the total shares issued in the Rule 145 offering. Compare Bank of Highland, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45668 (S.E.C.), at *4 (Sept. 6 1984) (suggesting that one percent
is calculated by reference to shares issued in Rule 145 transaction) and Mutual Trust Bank,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. Lexis 2487, at *2 (Aug. 20, 1984) (same), with
Hadson Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65178 (S.E.C.), at *5 (Jan. 1986)
(suggesting that one percent is not calculated by reference to shares in Rule 145 transaction)
and Stampede Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29990 (S.E.C.), at *6 (Dec.
4, 1981) (same) and Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WIL 29474
(S.E.C.), at *4 (July 26, 1982) (same) and Spencer R. Collins Charitable Trusts, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29320 (S.E.C.), at *4 (June 4, 1982) (same).
138. Generally, the one percent rule has been used by the Commission in resales of Exempt Rule 145 Securities acquired by a Holder under § 3(a)(10). See Hadson Petroleum
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65178 (S.E.C.), at *5 (Jan. 8, 1986); Western Gulf
Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29474 (S.E.C.), at *4 (July 26, 1982); Spencer
R. Collins Charitable Trusts, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29320 (S.E.C.), at *4 (June
4, 1982); Amoco Canada Petroleum Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,704, at 78,003 (Apr. 13, 1988) (declining to decide
whether one percent will make Holder an affiliate for purposes of resale).
For purposes of Rule 145, the Commission normally treats § 3(a)(9) and Regulation A
similarly to § 3(a)(10). Therefore, I assume that the one percent rule would be applied to
resales of Exempt Rule 145 Securities taken under those exemptions as well. See Campbell,
supra note 122, at 324-31. Again, although the Commission has not addressed the applicability of the one percent rule in Rule 147 situations, the rule could be applied by the
Commission in such cases. It seems highly unlikely that the Commission would apply the one
percent rule in the case of Rule 145 Securities taken in either a § 4(2) private placement or
a Regulation D offering, because those exemptions have well developed and quite onerous
resale provisions. See znfra notes 37-52 and accompanying text. Tis author's research
revealed no instance of the Commission's applying the one percent rule to the resale of
Registered Rule 145 Securities. Language from no-action letters seems to indicate that the
Commission would not apply the one percent rule in such instances. See, e.g., Coastal Int'l,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 15023 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Dec. 24, 1980) (stating that
"securities received in a Rule 145 transaction by persons who are neither affiliates of the
acquired company nor of the acquiring company are registered securities without restriction
on resale').
139 The most instructive no-action letters on the one percent rule include Hadson
Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65178 (S.E.C.) (Jan. 8, 1986); Pegasus
Gold, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45555 (S.E.C.) (July 20, 1984); Western Gulf
Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 W.L 29474 (S.E.C.) (July 26, 1982); Spencer R.
Collins Charitable Trusts, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29320 (S.E.C.) (June 4, 1982);
Bell Canada, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29887 (S.E.C.) (July 2, 1982); HRS Indus.,
Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29057 (S.E.C.) (Mar. 1, 1982); Stampede Energy
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29990 (S.E.C.) (Dec. 4, 1981); International Plasma
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means, then, that any public resale by a One Percent Holder may cause the
selling Holder, even though not a Rule 145 Affiliate, to become an underwriter 140 Obviously, this rule is inconsistent with the otherwise broad
applicability of the negative implication of Rule 145(c), as described above.
Not surprisingly, the Commission m its no-action letters constructed an
unprincipled exception to its unprincipled one percent rule. Specifically, the
Commission concluded that the one percent rule is not applicable if the
issuer in connection with its original issuance of the Exempt Rule 145
Securities made disclosures equivalent to those required of a reporting company under the 1934 Act and the issuer is subject to the periodic reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act.'41
Regarding Holders that are true Rule 145 Affiliates, the Commission

takes the position that the resale provisions of Rule 145(d) are available for
resales of Exempt Rule 145 Securities, even though the language of sec-

tion (d) speaks only of "registered securities" sold under the terms of
Rule 145(d). 42 Additionally, Rule 145 Affiliates that are Holders of Exempt
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10010 (S.E.C.) (July 31, 1974).
140. See Pegasus Gold, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45555 (S.E.C.), at *4-*7
(July 20, 1984); International Plasma Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10010
(S.E.C.), at *3 (July 31, 1974).
141. See Hadson Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65178 (S.E.C.),
at *4 (Jan. 1986); Pegasus Gold, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WI. 45555 (S.E.C.), at
*4-*7 (July 20, 1984); Spencer R. Collins Charitable Trusts, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982
WL 29320 (S.E.C.), at *1-*2, *4 (June 4, 1982); Bell Canada, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982
WL 29887 (S.E.C.), at *4-*5 (July 2, 1982); HRS Indus., Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982
WL 29057 (S.E.C.), at *5-*7 (Mar. 1, 1982); Stampede Energy Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1982 WI. 29990 (S.E.C.), at *5-*7 (Dec. 1981).
142. See First NH Banks, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107497 (S.E.C.), at *3-*5
(Dec. 24, 1986) (supporting availability of Rule 145(d) resales of securities held by Rule 145
Affiliate that were originally acquired in transactions exempt under § 3(a)(10) and Regulation
A); Hadson Petroleum Corpk, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65178 (S.E.C.), at *5 (Jan.
8, 1986); Metheus Dev Partners, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 54034 (S.E.C.),
at- *6 (Feb. 27, 1985); Saver's Bancorp, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 52010
(S.E.C.), at *4-*6 (Jan. 3, 1985); Old Stone Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45967
(S.E.C.), at *4 (Nov 19, 1984); Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982
WL 29474 (S.E.C.) (July 26, 1982); see also Resale of Restricted & Other Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-6099, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705H, at 2819-27
(Aug. 2, 1979) (stating that Holder may rely on resale provisions of Rule 145(d) for sale
of its Rule 145 securities originally acquired in transactions exempt under § 3(a)(9),
§ 3(a)(10), and Regulation A). It is interesting to note that in an earlier no-action letter, the
Commission denied the availability of Rule 145(d) for resales by a Rule 145 Affiliate holding
securities originally issued in a Rule 145 transaction exempt under Regulation A. See
Orbanco, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9537 (S.E.C.), at *4 (June 16, 1975). In
subsequent no-action letters, the Commission indicated its changed position on the matter.
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Rule 145 Securities should be able to execute private resales 43 and should
be able to resell publicly after an appropriate holding period or a change
in circumstances.' 44 Meeting any of the foregoing requirements will, for
the reasons discussed previously, cause the reselling Holder to fall outside

the definition
of "underwriter," thereby preserving its Section 4(1) exemp145
tion.
With regard to Exempt Rule 145 Securities held by a One Percent

Holder, the Commission, through its no-action letters, indicates that such
a Holder can resell only by meeting the requirements of sections (c), (e),
(f) and (g) of Rule 144.146 Notwithstanding such language of exclusivity,
a One Percent Holder has other resale options. Because the theoretical

effect of the one percent rule is to cause a One Percent Holder to become
subject to inclusion in the status of "underwriter" and thus make Section 4(1)
unavailable to such Holder, private resales and public resales after a suitable holding period or following a change in circumstances should certainly
See Indian Head Banks, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14023 (S.E.C.), at *1-*3 (May 29,
1979).
With regard to resales of Rule 145 Securities acquired by a Holder m a Rule 147 transaction, see Hungry Tiger, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29446 (S.E.C.) (Aug. 27,
1982); United Virginia Bankshares, SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 9785 (S.E.C.) (Feb.
13, 1978); Resale of Restricted & Other Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-6099, 1
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705H, at 2819-27 (Aug. 2, 1979). The proper interpretation
of thins Commission pronouncement, however, is that the availability of the exemption for the
issuer provided by Rule 147 is always dependent upon the Holder's meeting the nine month
holding period requirement. This requirement is not supplanted by Rule 145(d). After the
expiration of the nine month holding period of Rule 145(e), however, Rule 145 Affiliates
holding Rule 145 Securities taken pursuant to Rule 147 should be able to rely on Rule 145(d)
for resales.
143. See Beatrice Foods Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 20048 (S.E.C.), at *4
(Jan. 17, 1973); Sidney Stahl, SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 24892 (S.E.C.), at *2 (Mar.
23, 1981) (stating that if persons wish "to privately resell the securities without compliance
with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act, they may do so pursuant to any available
exemption, including the one popularly known as the Section 4(1 1/2) exemption").
144. See Sidney Stahl, SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 24892 (S.E.C.) (Mar. 23,
1981).
145. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
146. See Hadson Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65178 (S.E.C.),
at *3 (Jan. 8, 1986); Bank of Highland, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 47311 (S.E.C.),
at *4 (Sept. 6, 1984); Mutual Trust Bank, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act LEXIS
2487, at *1 (Aug. 20, 1984); Pegasus Gold, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45555
(S.E.C.), at *4 (July 20, 1984); Western Gulf Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL
29474 (S.E.C.), at *3 (July 26, 1982); HRS Indus., Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WIL
29057 (S.E.C.), at *7 (Mar. 1, 1982). These requirements, of course, are the requirements
of Rule 145(d)(1). See 17 C.F.R. 230.145(d)(1)(1995).
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be available for resales of Exempt Rule 145 Securities by One Percent
Holders.
4. Resales of Restncted Rule 145 Secunties
The rules regarding resales of Restricted Rule 145 Securities (i.e.,
Rule 145 Securities originally sold by issuers in transactions exempt under
Section 4(2) or Regulation D) can be explained with brevity Specifically,
resales of Restricted Rule 145 Securities are subject to the same rules that
govern resales of all restricted securities generally, which rules were described in Part II.A, above. Accordingly, neither the definition of underwriter in Rule 145(c) nor the special resale provisions of Rule 145(d) apply
to the resales of Restricted Rule 145 Securities. 147
The reasoning behind the inapplicability of Rule 145(c) and (d) to resales
of Restricted Rule 145 Securities is apparently founded on the need for consistency Permitting Restricted Rule 145 Securities to be sold under Rule
145(c) and (d) would mean that Restricted Rule 145 Securities would be subject to significantly more generous resale provisions than the resale provisions
available to non-Rule 145 Restricted Securities. 4 ' For example, if Holders
of Restricted Rule 145 Securities were permitted to resell under the provisions
of Rule 145(c) and (d), Holders that are not Rule 145 Affiliates could immed1 49
iately make unlimited public resales of their Restricted Rule 145 Securities.
Even Holders that are Rule 145 Affiliates could make immediate public resales of their Restricted Rule 145 Securities, although such resales would be
subject to the restrictions imposed by Rule 145(d)(1). 50 Holders of nonRule 145 Restricted Securities, on the other hand, are subject to additional
limitations on their resales, including, in many instances, a significant holding
period.' 5
147 Direct authority for this proposition is thin. The Commission in a 1979 interpretative release did, however, refuse to allow Rule 145 (d) to be used for the resale of Restricted
Rule 145 Securities. See Resale of Restricted & Other Securities, Securities Act Release No.
33-6099, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2705H, at 2819-27 (Aug. 2, 1979) (refusing to allow
Rule 145(d) to be used for resale of restricted Rule 145 Securities).
148. The interesting point, of course, is that the Commission seems unconcerned about
such disparate treatment in other situations, such as the difference in resales treatment
accorded intrastate securities acquired under Rule 145 as compared to the resale treatment
accorded intrastate securities acquired outside Rule 145 Transactions.
149 The reason is that, under the negative implication of Rule 145(c), public resales by
such Holders would not be considered a "distribution," the Holders would not be considered
"underwriters," and the § 4(1) exemption for the resales would be preserved.
150. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d)(1) (1995).
151. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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5. Concluding ObservationsAbout Resales ofRule 145 Securities
Favorable comments about Rule 145's resale provisions are not impos-

sible to make. First, the Commission initially proceeded publicly instead of

proceeding m the dark and musty world of no-action letters." 2 Second, the

broad theoretical and mechanistic bases for the resale rules in Rule 145 are
sound. Those resale rules operate properly within the definitional framework
of the 1933 Act by defining particular conduct as falling within or without the
concept of "distribution" and by defining particular Holders as within or

without the concept of "underwriter." Tis approach appropriately protects
the integrity of the 1933 Act. Finally, the resale provisions of Rule 145
represent an admirable, if less than successful, attempt to provide some clarity
regarding resales by Holders.'
The deficiencies of Rule 145's resale provisions substantially overwhelm
the positive aspects of those provisions, however. First, the resale provisions
of Rule 145 are inconsistent with other resale provisions. Neither sound
152. See Notice of Proposed Adoption of Rules 145 & 153A, Securities Act Release No.
5246, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,753 (May 2, 1972);
Securities Act Release No. 5316, supra note 1, at 79,015.
153. Unfortunately, predicating the availability of the § 4(i) exemption on such a
slippery concept as "control" of the acquired or recapitalized company is less than a
satisfactory solution to the problems of ambiguity and uncertainty. "Control" is a broad and
vague concept that may include anyone that either controls 10% or more of a company's
voting stock, holds a significant management position with the company or has a significant
business or family relationship with such owner or manager. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr.,
Defining Control in SecondaryDistributions, 18 B. C. IND. & COMM. L. REv 37, 49 (1976)
(indicating that availability of 4(1) exemption may be uncertain because such exemption is
based upon "control," an ambiguous term). The following no-action letters, which deal with
the question of whether persons associated with acquired compames constitute "affiliates"
under Rule 145(c), generally support such an interpretation. See Galbo, Vincent A., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 11238 (S.E.C.), at *3 (Sept. 22, 1977) (stating that Division
could not conclude that one who owned 3.8% of voting stock and was director and member
of executive committee was not affiliate); Norton Simon, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, 1976
WL 10567 (S.E.C.), at *5 (Oct. 8, 1976) (stating that Division could not conclude that one
who owned 1.2% of company's stock and served as director, semor vice-president, and
member of executive committee was not affiliate); Umservice Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1976 WL 10565 (S.E.C.), at *1 (July 13, 1976) (stating that one who was director and owned
stock, served as secretary to company and was member of law firm that was counsel to
company "may be deemed to be an affiliate"); Great N. Nekoosa Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1976 WL 10561 (S.E.C.), at *2 (Apr. 20, 1976) (stating that person "may be deemed
an affiliate" because she owned 10% and "her husband, children, and grandchildren and a
trust created by her collectively owned approximately 30%"). But see South Carolina Nat'l
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9174 (S.E.C.), at *1 (Apr. 21, 1975) (stating that
official policy of Commission is to not respond to no-action requests regarding existence of
control).
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policy nor the language of the 1933 Act support such differences. Second,
the rules regarding the resale of Rule 145 Securities are needlessly complex. 4 'Tlurd, the resale rules of Rule 145 are gross and indirect. Essentially, what seems to concern the Commimssion here is the specter of a large
quantity of securities being resold in a situation in which information about
the company is not publicly available. 5 ' The theory seems to be that resales
by persons that are, for example, Rule 145 Affiliates probably will involve
a lot of securities and thus those persons should be denied the exemption of
Section 4(1). The Commission, however, could and should deal with these
concerns in a more precise and direct fashion. Finally, the Commission
unfortunately retreated to no-action letters as a way to develop its resale
rules. Predictably, the results have been unsatisfactory 156
IL. The Resales Solution
To begin with the obvious, the Commission is the appropriate institution
to deal with the problems outlined above. Under the most basic of rationales
for administrative solutions to problems, agencies, like the Commission, are
often preferred over other institutions, such as courts or legislatures, because
of the agency's expertise and the capability of the agency to fashion and
monitor flexible remedies to complex problems. 7 Such a rationale for
Commission action is applicable here.
Statutorily, the Commission is well equipped under the 1933 Act to deal
with the problems of resales. Perhaps the most obvious statutory basis for
dealing with the problems of resales is the Commission's power under
Section 19(a) of the 1933 Act to define terms used inthe 1933 Act. 58 Section 19(a) is the basis for many of the Commission's rules defining exempt
transactions, ' 9 including transactions by Holders. The most apparent
154. See Campbell, supra note 122, at 317-36.
155. The fundamental tension here and elsewhere for the Commission when it deals with
resales by Holders generally is, of course, the tension between the desire to facilitate active
trading and the need for disclosure in connection with significant sales of securities. See
Loss, supra note 23, at 279-80.
156. See Campbell, supra note 122, at 338-43.
157 See 1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATivE LAw TREATISE § 1.05 (1958).
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1995) (giving Commission power of "defining accounting,
technical, and trade terms used in this title").
159 See Notice of Adoption of Rule 147, Securities Act Release No. 5450, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,617 (Jan. 7, 1974); Securities Act Release
No. 5316, supra note 1, Notice of Adoption of Regulation D, Securities Act Release No.
6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCHI) 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982).
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example is Rule 144,160 which defines certain sales by control persons and
Holders of Restricted Securities as outside the definition of "distribution,"
thereby protecting the availability of Section 4(1) for such resales.
Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, however, provides the Commission with
even broader and less constrained authority to deal with the problems of
resales. Essentially, that section permits the Commission to enact exemptions to the registration requirement if such exemptions are in the public
interest and the offerings do not exceed $5 million.' 6 ' As is the case with
Section 19(a), the Commission has used Section 3(b) to provide registration
exemptions 6for
issuers 62 and, to a lesser extent, for sales of securities by
3
nomssuers. 1
The administrative latitude under Section 3(b) makes the section particularly attractive as a basis for Commission action on resales. Constrained in
Section 3(b) only by the public interest and the amount criteria, the Commission could reexamine resales as a whole, free from what some may consider
the unfortunate, limiting language of Section 2(11) and Section 4(1). By
using Section 3(b) as a basis for constructing resale rules, the Commission
could also step out from under the mess it has created through its uncharacteristic ineptness, as over the years it wrestled with resale problems
involving securities taken m varying circumstances.
Whatever the basis for an adimmstrative solution, any Commission
action dealing with resales should be respectful of both the integrity of the
1933 Act and appropriate process. As the discussions m the first two sections of this paper indicate, the Commission in recent times has done poorly
in these regards. For example, the examination proffered by Part II of tis
Article reveals a set of resale rules that vary according to the transactional
authority for the issuer's original sale to the Holder. Thus, one finds that
different rules apply to the Holder's resale depending on whether the Holder
acquired its securities m a registered offering, a private placement, an

160. Notice of Adoption of Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 5223, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 78,487 (Jan. 11, 1972).
161. More specifically, § 3(b) authorizes the Commission to enact rules that exempt
securities from regulation if the Commission "finds that [registration]
is not necessary
in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount
involved or the limited character of the public offering
[provided that the issue] offered
to the public
[does not exceed] $5,000,000." 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994).
162. Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1995), and Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.505 (1995), are examples.
163. Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (1995), for example, permits resales by
control persons.
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intrastate offering, or an offering under Section 3(a)(9). These disparate
rules are unsupportable by any rational interpretation of the 1933 Act. Instead, in all of those situations the clear language of the 1933 Act predicates the Holder's freedom to resell on the Holder's not being an
"underwriter," a status that is entirely unrelated to the issuer's transactional
authority for its original sale to the Holder.
Such lack of respect by the Commission for the integrity of the 1933
Act is unjustified, even if such disparate resale rules promote the overall
policy of the 1933 Act. It is at this point that the Commission's lack of
respect for the integrity of the 1933 Act blends into its lack of respect for
process.
Suppose, for example, that one is convinced that the
Commission's present disparate treatment of resales of Registered
Securities and resales of Restricted Securities is justified as a matter of
policy
Operating under such an assumption, the Commission has
legislatively approved ways to promote such policy and at the same time to
respect both the integrity of the 1933 Act and sound procedures.
Specifically, the Commission could act under Section 3(b) or Section 19(a)
of the 1933 Act to formulate various and differing resale rules that promote
the perceived policy of the 1933 Act. The Commission would, of course,
have to act pursuant to its rulemaking authority, which would subject the
Commission to the requirements of the Admnimstrative Procedures Act.164
The Commission, however, has chosen to proceed otherwise and in its
course has flouted process and effectively established a series of resale
rules that do significant damage to the integrity of the 1933 Act and are
quite questionable as a matter of policy
One may observe with interest that the Commission had a close call
in the recent Cracker Barrel litigation. In the Cracker Barrel case, 6 ' the
District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that a particular no-action response amounted to rulemaking by the Commussion
and that, as a result, the Administrative Procedures Act required notice
and comment on no-action letters.' 66 On appeal, however, the Second
164. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-612 (1994). Rulemaking by the Commission must comply with
5 U.S.C. § 553's requirements. This would involve notice of the proposed rulemaking,
including a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking proceedings,
reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed, and either the terms of the
proposed rule or a description of the issues involved. After notice, interested persons must
be given an opportunity to participate in the rulemakmg.
165. New York City Employee's Retirement Sys. v SEC, 843 F Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y
1994).
166. See New York City Employees'RetirementSys., 843 F Supp. at 881 (concluding
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Circuit167 disagreed and accordingly overruled the decision of the district
court.

Whatever may be the outcome of the issues raised by the Cracker
Barrel litigation and the legal limits of the Commission's power to proceed
by no-action letters, the Commission should not be satisfied with regulatory
work at the lowest legally acceptable level. Thus, even if it is not legally
prohibited for the Commission to continue to develop its resale rules largely
through an unprincipled patch work of rules promulgated in responses to
no-action requests, the Commission should contain its urge to make significant law in that fashion. The process is poor and has given us a demonstrably poor set of rules.
Another goal of the Commission in connection with any reformation
of the resale rules should be to establish a regime that is clear, predictable,
and simple. Without these qualities, the deadweight costs of deals increase.
Lawyers fees, accounting fees, consulting fees, and internal costs for the

time of the issuer's staff all increase with uncertainty
Economists also remind us that uncertainty generates additional deadweight costs as risk adverse parties take less desirable and thus less efficient
paths to their goals.'6 Assume, for example, that a desirable resale method
for securities is judged by a Holder as carrying a thirty percent risk of
illegality A risk adverse Holder may choose an alternate method-of resale
because the present value of his or her risk of liability is an unacceptable
cost. If the resale method most desired by the Holder is in fact legal, and
that certain SEC actions regarding Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. violated
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)). In New York City Employees' Retirement System, the
court considered whether a rule announced in the Cracker Barrel no-action letter "was in
contravention of the notice and comment requirements of the APA. " Id. at 872. The district
court determined that the regulatory history of the rule, including the Agency's method and
authority for rule-making, the rule's legal effect, and the Commission's reversal of its
position, required a finding that the rule was legislative in nature. Id. at 881. Accordingly,
the district court-concluded that the promulgation of the rule should have followed the public
notice and comment procedures contemplated by the APA. Id.
167 New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1995).
168. Economists have made this argument most often in considering appropriate penalties
for violations of society's rules. In that context the point is made that an increase in the
harshness of penalties will cause risk adverse individuals to build a safety factor into their
conduct to ensure against an unintended violation. Thus, citizens will forego unprohibited
and thus assumedly beneficial conduct in order to eliminate the risk of an inadvertent
violation of the rule that carnes unusually harsh penalties. The loss of the beneficial conduct
in such instances is properly considered by economsts to be a loss in value to society
generally. See PoSNER, supra note 118, at 223-31.
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thus we must assume considered to be beneficial conduct for citizens to
undertake, economists argue, and rightly so, that the Holder's selecting the
alternate, less desirable resales method generates an unnecessary cost to
society
Finally, and clearly most importantly, any admimstrative solution to the
problems of resales must be consistent with the broad policy foundations of
the 1933 Act. My suggestion is that an analysis of the 1933 Act of the type
undertaken by economic positivists'69 is helpful to point the way to a resale
regime that promotes the policies of the 1933 Act.
The economic positivist would attempt to explain the 1933 Act in terms
of economic efficiency For the purposes of tlus discussion, economic
efficiency is defined as a pattern of resource allocation in which resources
are allocated to the person willing to pay most for the resource. 17 The
"resource" in this case is the information about the issuer and the transaction
(such information is hereinafter referred to as "stock information"). Thus,
the economic positivist would explain the 1933 Act in terms of whether or
not the act facilitates an efficient market in stock information. An efficient
market in stock information is essential to trading in the underlying resource,
the issuer's securities.1
The basic position of the neoclassical economist in all tis is that the
parties (the Holder and the purchaser from the Holder, for example) should
be left unfettered to trade for as much stock information as the parties desire.
Stock information is desirable to the parties because it reduces the risks
associated with trading in the underlying commodity (i.e., the issuers'
securities), but stock information is expensive to gather. In the view of the
neoclassical economist, the parties should be free to bargain regarding this
169 Posner defines "the positive role of economic analysis of law [as] the attempt to
explain legal rules and outcomes as they are rather than to change them to make them better."
He goes on to state the typical conclusion of the economic positivists, which is that "especially but not only the great common law fields of property, torts, crimes, and contracts, bear
the stamp of economic reasoning
The theory is that the common law is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maxuizng the wealth of society." POSNER, supra note 118,
at 23.
170. See POSNER, supra note 118, at 11-15. For a discussion of other 'definitions of
economic efficiency, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, & Wealth Maximization, 8
HOFSTRA L. REv 509, 512 (1980).
171. Predictably, much has been written by the proponents (and opponents) of the law
and economics movement both on the mandated disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act, the
1934 Act, and generally on the securities laws. Two good collections of important readings
on these matters are found in RICHARD A. PosNER & KENNETH E. ScOTt, ECONOMICS Op
CORPORATION LAW & SECURITIES REGULATION

118-54, 315-81 (1980) and

ROMANo, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 301-28 (1992).

ROBERTA
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classic risk-return trade off. This freedom to trade is essential if the parties
are to reach economic efficiency regarding stock information itself and
ultimately the issuers' securities. 172
The regime of mandatory disclosures required by Section 5 of the 1933
Act limits the parties discretion to bargain freely regarding the delivery of
stock information and thus is inconsistent with economic efficiency No
longer are the parties free to fashion levels of disclosure that best suit their
needs, but, instead, the government imposes mandatory terms regarding
disclosure levels. The economic positivist often attempts to explain such
governmental intrusions into free bargaining as responses to market failures.
The imposition of mandatory terms on free bargaining can be explained as
an attempt by society to reach an economically efficient result in situations
m which the market, for whatever reason, is unable to function in a way that
ensures the parties will be able to bargain efficiently or, perhaps, at all.
Applying this extremely general description of economic positivism to
the 1933 Act is instructive. Generally, what one finds, perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, is that the 1933 Act broadly utilizes a market solution regarding
the matter of disclosure between buyers and sellers of stock. This becomes
apparent when one considers that the 1933 act imposes mandatory disclosures in only a very small percentage of all securities transactions. In the
vast majority of securities transactions, the exemptions from registration
eliminate mandatory disclosure between buyers and sellers, and in such cases
bargaining between the parties determines the terms of information
disclosure.
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Pursuing this line of analysis, then, the economic positivist may attempt
to identify and explain in economic terms those situations in which
Congress, through the 1933 Act, elected to replace free bargaining with a
regime of mandatory disclosure. Essentially, Congress, at least as a general
matter, imposed mandatory disclosure only if the following two conditions
are both present: (1) The transaction generates a significant risk of a market
failure with respect to stock information, either because bargaining between
the parties to the transactions with respect to stock information appears
difficult or because the purchaser otherwise appears disadvantaged or
172. See PosNER, supra note 118, at 9-15 (discussing trading and its importance to
economic efficiency).
173. I would include here transactions "exempt" because of failure to meet the jurisdictional requirements of § 5. Generally, the mandatory disclosure requirements of § 5 are
limited in applicability to offers and sales that "make use of any means or instruments of
transportation or comnumcation in interstate commerce or of the mails." 15 U.S.C. § 77e(i)
(1994).

1382

52 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1333 (1995)

inefficient in obtaining stock information; and (2) The purchaser is not otherwise protected by a relatively efficient securities market that likely impounds
substantially all material stock information in the price of the security
Stated alternatively, under the 1933 Act, Congress exempted from the
mandatory disclosure requirements of Section 5 (and thus opted for a regime
of free bargaining and market solutions) transactions in which either the
market for stock information between the purchaser and seller at the time of
the transaction is considered reasonably efficient or the purchaser generally
is otherwise protected by a reasonably efficient market in the security that
is the subject of the transaction.
Consider, for example, the intrastate exemption, which eliminates the
requirement for mandatory disclosures in situations in which the issuer and
the purchasers are all in the same state. In such cases, geographic proximity
between the issuer and the purchaser may be considered sufficient to ensure
that bargaining with regard to stock information is essentially unimpeded.' 74
The private placement exemption can be explained similarly If the purchaser under Section 4(2) is sopusticated and has access to all information
about the issuer, definitionally the market for stock information is working
and thus no need exists for imposing the mandatory disclosure requirements
of the 1933 Act.'
Explaining the economic basis for the exemption provided by Section
4(1) of the 1933 Act is a particularly interesting challenge. One may
conclude, however, that in most face-to-face sales involving a seller that is
not an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, bargaining between the purchaser and
seller regarding stock information is relatively unimpeded. To make the
economic case against mandated disclosure in those face-to-face situations
even stronger, the purchaser of the securities may be at least as efficient in
gathering stock information as the seller.
In non-face-to-face sales involving a seller that is not an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, however, the reliance on a market solution for levels of
disclosure is impossible to explain in terms of ease of bargaining between the
parties. On the other hand, the availability in such situations of the exemption from mandatory disclosure provided by Section 4(1) may be explained
as based on the existence of a reasonably efficient securities market, which
impounds in the price of the securities all material information. Although
not all such non-face-to-face sales are made in reasonably efficient markets,
174. See Hicks, supra note 74, at 499 (explaining that geographic proximity to issuer is
part of explanation for intrastate exemption for purchaser under § 3(a)(11)).
175. For a discussion of the requirements for the common-law exemption provided by
§ 4(2), see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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by volume most such sales certainly are made through such reasonably
efficient markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ
system.
This economic analysis, which is illuminating regarding the bedrock
policies of the 1933 Act, leads to the conclusion that the case for extensive
and rigorous mandatory disclosure obligations on a Holder is weak. In most
instances, the purchaser from the Holder either is able to acquire stock information in a reasonably efficient manner (either by bargaining with the
Holder or otherwise) or acquires its securities in or with access to a
reasonably efficient securities market. The analysis, therefore, favors lenient
resale provisions for Holders.
The inevitable possibility exists, however, that the issuer will utilize
generous resale rules as a way of evading the mandatory disclosure requirements otherwise imposed on the issuer. Suppose, as an extreme example,
all resales were unrestricted. The issuer could avoid registration by selling
"privately" to five investment bankers, who could then resell the entire offermg publicly without any disclosures whatsoever. Obviously, such a practice
would eviscerate the 1933 Act. The Commission, rightfully so, will not
allow that to happen.
Considering all the foregoing, my suggestion is that the Commission
proceed under Section 3(b) to enact a clear, simple, and, to the extent possible, lement and unified rule governing resales by a Holder. The rule
should focus more on preventing the issuer from subverting the policy
underlying its obligation of mandatory disclosures under the 1933 Act than
on protecting the Holders' purchasers.
My specific proposal for consideration is a rule that exempts from registration resales by Holders that either acquire less than a particular amount
of the isser's offering (perhaps five percent) or that hold the securities (and
are economically at risk for the securities) for a mmnmum of six months. I
recommend this rule not necessarily as the ultimate definitive rule regarding
resales but, instead, more as a framework or an example of a sensible
approach to this difficult problem. It may be, for example, that the
Commission would conclude that m light of the realities of economic
pressures and exposure under the general antifraud provisions of the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act, the upper limit of the exception for resales of registered offerings could be ten percent. The Commission may also consider
that the limits of the exemption should vary somewhat depending on particular facts, such as, for example, whether the issuer is a reporting company
under the 1934 Act and the breadth of trading activity in the issuer's stock.
However the Commission may resolve such details, the rule should be
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simple, direct, easy to administer, and not subject over the years to redefinition through the no-action process. Instead, the Commission should momtor the new rule and make any significant adjustments through the normal
administrative process.
IV Conclusion
The rules regarding resales of securities are essentially unprincipled and
unnecessarily complex. The Commission must assume full responsibility for
this unfortunate state of affairs.
One should dismiss the urge to be overly generous regarding this failure
on the part of the Commission. Neither the conceptual and pragmatic difficulties involved in these problems nor the usual honorable and efficient work
of the Commission excuses the Commission's failings. The Commission has
at its disposal an effective array of administrative tools to deal with these
problems. Instead of proceeding in a responsible manner, however, the
Commission has elected to proceed through a series of disjointed and mefficient administrative actions, principally through no-action letters. The poor
results could have been predicted.
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